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I. WHY STUDY CAUSE LAWYERS?
 Lawyers for social causes are familiar in America.  “Cause lawyering,” described 
as law practice “furthering a vision of the good society,”1 is also global.  Although 
American scholars trace its origins to liberal legalism and movements for civil rights 
in the United States and Europe,2 cause lawyering has become increasingly visible on 
the world stage in societies whose legal traditions are very different, although most 
case studies of successful cause lawyers come from developed democracies, their 
former colonies, and especially those societies influenced by the common law.3  
 Thailand, the site of my research, is an Asian society with a long history of 
authoritarian government and a legal system inf luenced by civil law traditions.4 
Unique among Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has never been colonized or 
subjugated to European law.  We may fairly ask, then, why would individuals drawn 
to social advocacy choose to deploy a symbolic resource such as law, and especially 
the “rule of law,” against a powerful government in a society where law has uncertain 
legitimacy and legal advocacy has unproven power?  Observing the growing global 
attraction to rights advocacy under circumstances such as these, legal anthropologist 
Sally Engle Merry sensibly concludes that “[t]aking on rights is a difficult process 
and fraught with ambivalence.  Asserting rights often comes at a price.”5  
 Cause lawyers, of course, are not typical anywhere, and that is why they are 
interesting.  In the United States, cause lawyering is related to an important aspiration 
of client-centered professionalism—achieving justice for each client and placing that 
goal at times ahead of making money and personal benefit.6  Many lawyers, though 
1. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: An 
Introduction, in Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 
3, 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
2. See generally Stuart A. Scheingold & Austin Sarat, Something to Believe In: Politics, 
Professionalism, and Cause Lawyering 23–50 (2004) (providing a historical context of cause 
lawyering).
3. See generally Cause Lawyers and Social Movements (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 
2006) (containing essays relating to the life cycle of social movements and the effect that cause lawyers 
and the social movements have on one another); Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) (containing essays relating to cause lawyering in, among 
other locations, Ghana, the United Kingdom, Latin America, the United States, and Israel); Law and 
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & 
César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005) (focusing on the changes in legal institutions against the 
backdrop of globalization through a collection of essays); The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: 
Structure and Agency in Legal Practice (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005) 
(containing essays highlighting the breadth of causes served and providing information on case studies 
from India, Argentina, and the United Kingdom); Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 1, at 5–7 (contrasting, 
at a superficial level, the development of cause lawyering in common law and civil societies, as well as in 
rule-of-law systems and authoritarian regimes). 
4. See discussion infra Part IV.  See generally Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of 
Thailand (2005).
5. Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law 
into Local Justice 216 (2006).
6. A fundamental principle of the lawyer-client relationships in Anglo-Saxon law is client loyalty; 
accordingly, a lawyer’s judgment and effort is exercised “solely for the benefit of his client and free of 
compromising inf luences and loyalties.”  Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 5-1 (1980) 
(correlating with Model Rules 1.7(a), 1.8(c)–(g) & (j)).  As amplified by aspirational statements within 
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choosing a more traditional practice recognize the importance and legitimacy of 
cause lawyering, if not the legitimacy of everything that cause lawyers do.   Even 
lawyers who are not and will never be activists defend the profession’s activism, its 
involvement in public interest law, pro bono requirements, and law reform because 
they believe that these activities reflect the profession’s political independence and 
power, as well as its entitlement to public respect.  These symbolic resources are 
assets that legitimize the deep involvement of lawyers in the development of society 
through policy-making, international relations, and overall political life.  The 
viability of cause lawyering as a career may indeed be a good measure of the legal 
profession’s political independence and power and may illuminate the role and 
legitimacy of law in a society.  
 The strength of the American legal profession, and its cause lawyers, is closely 
related to America’s unique political institutions.  Other societies, like Thailand, 
whose history and institutions create a different and more limited role for law in 
contention for power, provide less promising terrain for cause lawyers.   No one 
doubts the power of lawyers in the United States.7  “In the US,” write scholars Yves 
Dezalay and Bryant Garth, “‘symbolic innovators’ . . . gravitate to the powerful and 
relatively autonomous professional milieus.”8  In other words, in the United States 
ambitious activists often pursue some type of public interest law practice.  My study 
asks why, in spite of Thailand’s less promising terrain, do Thai activists invest in law 
and what do they achieve by doing so?  Answering these questions will help us 
understand the practical meaning of “rule of law” in Thailand from an important 
perspective: lawyers seeking to open greater political space for social causes.  
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as 
statements of purpose of virtually every bar association, lawyers maintain a stance of seeking the full 
measure of justice on behalf of clients. 
7. Many studies amply demonstrate the power of lawyers and law firms in American policy making.  See, 
e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 
(1976); William Haltom & Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the 
Litigation Crisis 116–20 (2004); John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social 
Structure of the Bar 50 (2005); Robert Gordon, Lawyers and Legal Thought in the Age of Enterprise, 
in Professions and Professional Ideologies in America 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); Ronan 
Shamir, Professionalism and the Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and Administrative Law 1933–1937, 27 
Law & Soc’y Rev. 361 (1993).  Counterintuitively, a study of the role of Washington, D.C., law firms 
in the policy making processes of Congress and administrative agencies suggests that they may be less 
involved in policy making than their reputation, based upon a myth of lawyer dominance, suggests.  See 
Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 237 
(1988).  On the inf luential role of lawyers in foreign policy from the late nineteenth century onward, see 
Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in 3 Cambridge History of Law in 
America 718 (2008).  Famed French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu comments that the far greater power 
of lawyers in the common law legal tradition than in the civil law tradition begins with the authoritative 
interpretation of law by courts in the common law tradition and, in turn, the power of lawyers to 
inf luence interpretation.  Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
Hastings L.J. 814, 822 (1987). 
8. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, 
Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States 55–56 (2002).
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 Research that involves charting social justice lawyers’ careers is a new strategy 
with great potential in the field of socio-legal studies of the rule of law in developing 
societies.  Dezalay and Garth’s groundbreaking comparative study of the political 
independence of lawyers in the United States and Latin America relied on 
microhistories of lawyers’ careers.9  Their interviews tapped the local and intimate 
knowledge of the power and limitations of law that is required for the successful 
pursuit of a legal career and for the deployment of the symbolic resources at the 
profession’s disposal.  Similarly, my collective biography of social justice lawyers in 
Thailand potentially provides a rich mapping of the paths open to those who choose 
law and of the opportunities to use law to influence other institutions of the society, 
especially government.  
 This article provides a preliminary report of research based on interviews 
conducted in Thailand with Thai lawyers and other activists on behalf of a wide 
variety of politically weak or socially disadvantaged groups seeking equality, power, 
or merely recognition for their causes.  The multi-generational and variously 
committed ensemble of interviewees permits comparison of the opportunities, 
limitations, and successes and failures of law in many contexts, increasing the 
likelihood of observing patterns.  In my interviews, I ask when and how they use the 
law on behalf of social movements and causes, about their methods of work and how 
they support themselves, about the nature of their clients or other work if their work 
is not for specific clients, and about their successes and failures.  I chart their careers, 
how and why they entered the profession, their networks of collaborators, and, as 
accurately as possible, the mentors, role-models, or institutions that taught them or 
directed their career paths.  I pay particular attention to the networks and movements 
they attempt to build and to their perceptions of their own work.  
 Part II of this article describes the origin of the concept of cause lawyering, the 
paradoxes of its attractiveness outside the safe haven of developed, liberal democracies, 
and the dependence of law on a unique and uncertain process of adaptation in each 
developing society.  Part III describes the strengths of the research strategy employed 
by this study, which is a multi-generational collective biography.  Part IV introduces 
four Thai social justice lawyers, describes their careers, and sets forth the historical 
context of each.  Part V discusses what the narratives reveal about the influence of 
social change on the four careers described in Part IV.  Part VI, my conclusion, offers 
a brief speculation about the effects of social justice law practice on achievement of 
the “good society”—a vision in which the rule of law becomes a means to greater 
political space for the social causes of the lawyers—and what we might learn from 
fuller examination of cause lawyers’ careers. 
9. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power: Investing in Human Rights as an 
Alternative Political Strategy, in Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era,  supra note 3, at 
354; Dezalay & Garth, supra note 8.
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II. CAUSE LAWYERS IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE     
 A rapidly growing literature on cause lawyering takes liberal legalism as its 
starting point.10  Liberal legalism, the dominant legal ideology in developed Western 
democracies, combines two conflicting premises.  First, liberal legalism incorporates 
the rule of law, a concept that encompasses procedures that serve to legitimize the 
state’s authority.11  Second, liberal legalism establishes absolute limits on the state’s 
authority that protect autonomy, equality, and other individual and community 
values.12  Lawyers, as members of a profession privileged by the state, stand between 
these two potentially conflicting mandates, serving by grace of the state’s authority 
but often challenging the state’s authority for transgressions of substantive rights. 
Under liberal legalism, lawyers exercise their privileges to mobilize the law with 
some degree of immunity from reprisal or interference even when they invoke rights 
that challenge the state’s authority.13  Emphasis on individual rights creates space for 
advocacy not only for existing rights, but also for the expansion of rights and even for 
new rights that will bring about substantial social change on behalf of individuals or 
the public generally.14  In the United States, cause lawyers have often succeeded in 
their advocacy for new rights that impose limits on the state and have rarely faced 
reprisal for their advocacy.15  For this reason, scholarship about U.S. cause lawyers 
has focused less on the consequences of conf lict with the state than on lawyers’ 
motivation, the structure of their practices, and the roles they play in movements for 
social justice.
 This picture changes in societies where assumptions about the rule of law, rights, 
and the lawyer’s professional role are quite different.  In many societies, “speaking 
law to power”16 risks more serious reprisal than in Western democracies.  Professor 
Richard Abel’s examination of the institutional sources of opportunity for cause 
lawyering worldwide suggests that both liberal legal ideology and the institutional 
and political framework of a society are important.17  The United States’ well-
10. See Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 2; Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 1.
11. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 92 (2004).
12. See id. at 110–11.
13. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239, 1242–46 (1991); David 
Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 873, 877–80 (1980).  There is a large 
literature on zealous advocacy and nonaccountability as professional norms.  
14. See Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 2, at 13–14.  But liberal legalism does not encompass advocacy for 
changes in the basic institutions of society or change by means other than advocacy for rights through 
the court system.  See id. at 15–17.
15. See Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in Cause Lawyering: 
Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 69.
16. Id.  Abel’s use of the phrase “speaking law to power” is a play on the claim made by some activists that 
“speaking truth to power” is an effective weapon for the weak.  Similarly, the phrase “speaking law to 
power” ref lects the belief held by some lawyers that the law can be a weapon of the weak who seek to 
limit abuses of power.  Id. at 103.
17. Id. at 70.
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entrenched ideology of rights and a relatively independent judiciary are important 
factors facilitating cause lawyering, but they, in turn, have developed in part because 
of the opportunities to challenge state authority created by federalism, separation of 
powers, and institutional support for professional autonomy.18  Abel examined 
societies that ranged from authoritarian to newly emerging democracies and corrupt 
dictatorships.  He found that “speaking law to power” also occurs in the absence of 
significant support for liberal legalism in societies where law and legal process 
generally lack either moral legitimacy or the support of independent legal 
institutions.19  
 The seemingly paradoxical attraction of cause lawyering in such societies has 
been accompanied by an astonishing rise in the number of lawyers, and especially in 
some of the societies most resistant to democracy and human rights.20  The mere 
presence of a rapidly growing legal profession does not translate into politically 
independent law, legal institutions, or liberal democracy, at least in the short run.21 
As Professor William Alford observes in his discussion of the rapidly rising numbers 
of lawyers in East Asian societies, there are many new roles for lawyers in rapidly 
evolving societies that do not involve confronting state authority.  Quite the opposite, 
lawyers provide services that augment state control and help government (whatever 
its character) manage relationships with international regulation, finance, and 
commerce.22  Many forces for change combine to make entry into the legal profession 
more attractive.  Chief among them is the global economic boom, which has made 
lawyers, among other anomalies, the highest paid profession in China.23  Other 
factors that influence the role lawyers play in each society include the international 
symbolic significance of constitutionalism24 and law “as the skeleton of the modern 
state”;25 pressure from institutions of global finance; and domestic demand in even 
18. Id. at 71, 87–95.
19. Id. at 78–102.
20. See William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searching for Legal Professionalism in the People’s 
Republic of China, in Raising the Bar: The Emerging Legal Profession in East Asia 287, 290 
(William P. Alford ed., 2007) (discussing the rising number of lawyers in China); Daniel S. Lev, A Tale 
of Two Legal Professions: Lawyers and State in Malaysia and Indonesia, in Raising the Bar, supra, at 383, 
387, 400 (discussing the rising numbers of lawyers in Malaysia and Indonesia).  
21. See William P. Alford, Introduction, in Raising the Bar, supra note 20, at 1, 7.  Scholars debate the 
long run, some anticipating convergence, others suggesting that the historical path of the legal profession 
in many developing societies will be unique.  Id.  
22. See id. at 6–9.
23. Randall Peerenboom, Assoc. Fellow, Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Socio-Legal Studies, Speech at the Annual 
Meeting of the Law and Society Association (July 2007). 
24. Elizabeth Heger Boyle & John W. Meyer, Modern Law as a Secularized and Global Model: Implications for 
the Sociology of Law, in Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation 
of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).  
25. Daniel S. Lev, Introduction, in Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia: 
Selected Essays 3, 3 (2000).
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the most authoritarian states, however ineffectual, for accountability, transparency, 
and fairness as social and economic change transform public life.26
 Thailand’s experience exhibits a similarly paradoxical pattern.  Since the mid-
twentieth century, while Thailand’s population has tripled, the number of lawyers in 
Thailand has increased more than twenty-five fold.  In 1960, fewer than 2000 
lawyers existed in a population of 23 million; in 2008, there are more than 54,000 
private lawyers in a population of 60 million, while thousands more work for the 
government as judges, prosecutors, or legal advisors.27  No doubt Thailand’s booming 
economy has contributed to the rapidly increasing number of lawyers, raising law 
from among the also-rans of university education to one of the most popular fields of 
study.28  Over roughly the same period, Thailand has experienced nineteen military 
coups, the latest in 2006, has had eighteen constitutions, and is still widely criticized 
for recent human rights violations.29  
 In contrast to earlier periods of global interconnection that were accelerated by 
revolutions in transportation (sixteenth through nineteenth centuries) and global 
finance (post-World War II), contemporary “third wave” globalization is distinctively 
about transnational inf luence on governance, through exporting institutions, 
organization, and technology.30  The current wave of global interconnection has 
opened the door as never before to mutual influence. 31  Cultural exports, in the form 
of rights, political institutions, or technology of production, have taken shape on the 
ground in societies such as Thailand.  In turn, developing countries contribute 
distinctive views to international discourse on human rights, “Asian values,” and rule 
26. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 21, at 9–17 (summarizing the findings of studies of the legal profession in 
East Asia included in the volume).
27. Lawyers at the end of the 1960s are enumerated in Nat’l Statistical Office, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 28 Statistical Yearbook Thailand, 1967–1969, at 159 [hereinafter Statistical 
Yearbook].  For the number of lawyers registered by the Lawyers Council of Thailand as of 2007, see 
Lawyers Council of Thailand, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/directory/data/E07-Lawyers_Council_
of_Thailand.pdf.  
28. See Ministry of Educ., Annual Report of the Ministry of Education of Thailand (2003) 
[hereinafter MOE Annual Report].  It is also evidenced by the rapid increase in the number of state 
and private law schools. See infra note 97.     
29. See Frank Munger, Constitutional Reform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen Participation in Thailand, 40 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 455 (2007); David Streckfuss & Mark Templeton, Human Rights and Political 
Reform in Thailand, in Reforming Thai Politics 73, 86 (Duncan McCargo ed., 2002). 
30. Ammar Siamwalla, Globalisation and Its Governance in Historical Perspective, in Social Challenges 
for the Mekong Region 13, 34–35 (Mingsan Kaosa-ard et al. eds., 2003).  I am calling Siamwalla’s 
second phase of the Second Globalisation a “third” wave because of its distinctive emphasis on political 
and economic governance, rather than finance, but otherwise I accept his characterizations of relevant 
changes and their effects.  
31. Lauren Benton has shown that mutual inf luence is always present even in relations of formally unequal 
global inf luence, such as conquest and colonization.  See Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial 
Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History 1400–1900 (2002).
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of law.32  The rule of law and liberal legalism are important exports from the Global 
North,33 promoted by dominant world financial and political powers to encourage 
stability, but also frequently embraced by domestic advocates who believe that rights 
will support equality, accountability, and social welfare within their own societies.34  
 Widespread advocacy for the rule of law begins with the most powerful 
international actors, and it is often prescriptive, suggesting that adoption of Western 
models for economic and social regulations, individual rights, and legal process are 
key stepping stones to prosperity and democracy.  Many of the most important 
contemporary advocates for rule of law reforms are powerful international economic 
and political actors who promote democracy and the rule of law to stabilize emerging 
societies for the benefit of the global economy.35  But advocates with other goals—for 
example, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promote human rights, 
United Nations agencies, and religious institutions—have also become highly 
influential.36  While international agencies such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. Department of State have promoted rule of law 
from the top down—through structural adjustment, diplomatic inf luence, and 
technical expertise resulting in statutory and constitutional reform—more progressive, 
humanitarian NGOs and organizations have attempted to influence change at the 
grassroots level by linking ideas, technical skills, and financial resources to local 
participation in rights advocacy.37  
 Professors Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink proposed a “spiral model” to 
explain a pattern that they perceived created successful movements for enforcement 
of international rights regimes through a combination of local advocacy and 
32. See generally Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law 
in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) (explaining 
Asian conceptions of rule of law and providing an empirical foundation to the debate about “Asian 
values”).
33. “Global North” is a term used widely to refer to the political, economic, and cultural perspectives of the 
economically developed societies, predominantly, but not exclusively, in North America and Europe. 
See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Three Metaphors for a New Conception of Law:  The Frontier, the 
Baroque, and the South, 29 Law & Soc’y Rev. 569, 579 (1995) (exploring the potential significance of the 
concept of Global North and Global South).
34. See id. at 581; Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: 
In Search of Knowledge 3, 6–11 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
35. See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in The 
New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro 
Santos eds., 2006); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in Promoting the Rule 
of Law Abroad, supra note 34, at 75.  See generally Gary R. Hess, Waging the Cold War in the Third 
World: The Foundations and the Challenges of Development, in Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility 
in American History (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003).
36. See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics 6 (1998); Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in Cause 
Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 349; 
Jessica T. Mathews, Foreword to Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, 
supra note 34, at vii.
37. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 36.
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international pressure.38  According to their theory, partnerships between an 
international and a local advocacy group ensure that rights advocacy has validity in 
the local “vernacular,”39 while pressure from international advocates, phased in over 
the lifetime of a local movement, creates an ascending spiral of influence pressuring 
a recalcitrant government toward the implementation of a particular regime of rights. 
The key to the “spiral model” is the presence of Transnational Advocacy Networks 
(TANS) which link local advocates with their counterparts in International 
Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), international agencies, and foreign 
countries in a position to deploy a hegemonic discourse of rights in ways the 
government of the society may be less willing to ignore.40  
 Professor Daniel Lev has observed that even in Europe there were “long histories 
that produced distinctive local institutions and legal habits.”41  Contrary to the views 
of American and European scholars who seem to consider an idealized version of 
“Western” law a standard by which to judge the evolution of other legal systems, he 
maintained that there was nothing natural or universal about the Continental 
“rechtsstaat” or the English “rule of law.”  These systems of legal thought have been 
promoted as universal ideals, but they are rationalizations for systems of law that 
favored newly emerging political or economic interests.  Their adoption by other 
societies with different histories is not inevitable and where different dominant 
interests promote development.  Lev concludes that many new states now face 
problems similar to those faced a century or more ago in Europe and that influential 
groups have embraced a familiar solution, namely to “establish some controls over 
powerful governments by subjecting them to more or less autonomous legal process.”42 
Nevertheless, he cautions, in new states, 
pressures toward constitutionalism and more effective legal process have 
advantages and suffer constraints quite different from those of old 
Europe . . . .  [I]deas, in Asia as in Europe or anywhere else, take hold only 
when they make sense domestically and are adapted to domestic purposes.43 
38. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikknik eds., 1999).
39. Merry, supra note 5, at 1 (describing meaningful characterization of human rights concepts in local 
contexts as translation into the “vernacular”).
40. TANs are networks of advocates for particular policies or rights that are “distinguishable largely by the 
centrality of principled ideas or values.”  They offer a variety of resources, such as legitimacy for social 
justice claims (and rights) or media and political access for progressive advocacy, as well as material and 
technical resources.  Social movements may be drawn to TANs and choose lawyers associated with 
them.  Keck & Sikkink, supra note 36, at 1.
41. Lev, supra note 25, at 4.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id.  
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III. WHAT CAUSE LAWYERS DO: A RESEARCH STRATEGY
 In their study comparing human rights lawyers in the United States and Latin 
America, Dezalay and Garth adopted a promising approach to understanding the 
complex means by which law and legal process take hold or fail in developing 
societies.  The study focused on “microhistories” of lawyers’ careers, “and, more 
generally, relational biograph[ies],” through which they were able to describe human 
rights advocacy in each society as a field “constructed out of the tools and resources 
that were available to particular actors at discrete moments.”44  Through analysis of 
the collective biographies of elite lawyers, they were able to “situate individuals in 
relation to others in fields that are constantly changing.”45  Their approach illuminated 
the relationship between opportunities for legal action and the institutional structure 
underscored by Lev.  Tracing careers objectively illustrates, in a way that no 
declaration of motives, ideals, or principles could, the evolving opportunities, rewards, 
and limits for legal advocacy within Latin American and U.S. political institutions.
 Tracing the careers of human rights lawyers in the United States and Latin 
America revealed sharp differences in the relationship between law and the “field of 
state power.”46  Investing in law offered very different career opportunities and 
leverage for political change in the two hemispheres.  While human rights advocacy 
and public interest law practice are widely valorized in the United States—and may 
be a springboard to a mainstream legal career, professional status, and influence in 
politics and government—investment in similar legal activity in Latin America is 
typically a dead end.47  There the path to power is through politics, not law.  Because 
law lacks independent institutional support, human rights and public interest law 
practice earns little respect and accumulates far less professional capital in Latin 
America.  
 Dezalay and Garth’s research on lawyers’ careers has important implications for 
better understanding the globalization of legal expertise and the success of rights-
based advocacy.48  The resources contributed by global networks of advocacy, foreign 
44. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 355.  The authors’ conceptualization of a career employed throughout 
their work is derived from the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who describes the factors 
which contribute to construction of a field of action.  A “field” is conceived as a “patterned system of 
objective forces” that “prescribes its particular values and possesses its own regulative principles” which 
governs the probability of rewards or sanctions.  Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An 
Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 17–18 (1992). 
45. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 355. 
46. Id.  The “field of state power” is a field in which actors attempt to exercise power over or on behalf of 
the state. 
47. See id. at 356–58.
48. Over the past thirty years, networks of advocates for human rights and other rights-based causes have 
grown in number, resources, and inf luence.  See id. at 354.  Latin American human rights lawyers, 
Dezalay and Garth argue, have been sustained almost entirely by funding from U.S. philanthropies and 
legitimacy derived from international affiliations.  See id. at 361–63.  The authors describe the growth 
of Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) as organizations driven in large part 
by their dissenting stance within U.S. domestic politics and their evolving strategies for inf luencing 
American political opinion, as well as world opinion.  See id. at 360–62, 364–65.  The Ford Foundation, 
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aid, or international organizations supporting human rights had far from the expected 
long term effects.  Where the structural determinants of legal careers were quite 
different in Latin America from the United States, career narratives revealed different 
potentials and limits for law.  Further, Dezalay and Garth advise scholars who are 
“promoters of transnational cause lawyering to investigate critically the norms that 
gain legitimacy, funding and media attention in the places that count.”  The place 
that counts most is often Washington, D.C., where United States’ foreign policy 
shapes the goals of many international networks whose apparent disagreements with 
foreign policy often merely fine tune the same overall approach to transplantation of 
familiar legal institutions to developing societies.49  
 Lawyers’ careers, therefore, have provided a promising starting point for 
examining both the evolving role of law and the influence of global advocacy for 
rights in developing societies; but to achieve a better understanding, the research 
must go well beyond the boundaries of Professors Dezalay and Garth’s research. 
While they helpfully draw attention to the “system of objective forces” influencing 
career decisions, they have, for comparative purposes, greatly simplified their account 
of the forces at work in shaping lawyers’ careers by explaining differences largely in 
terms of the overall strength or weakness of the profession and, in turn, the legal 
system’s overall political dependence or independence.  This oversimplification 
ignores local variation in the influence of law, which may be important, for example, 
to the relative importance of law in regulating different institutional sectors or in 
mediating different types of relationships between individuals and government.50 
While law may lack power with respect to some traditional institutions and some 
types of social relationships, it may have much greater power with respect to others. 
Thus, Dezalay and Garth may have drawn broad conclusions ref lecting only the 
views of an inner circle of state power in countries where the legitimacy of law is 
weak at the highest levels but not uniform or static throughout the society.  
 Theory and empirical research suggest the “forces” that draw cause lawyers into 
careers and influence deployment of their expertise include the structure of work 
and later AI and HRW, focused on funding human rights organizations in Latin America in opposition 
to the then official American foreign policy to support Latin American dictators.  See id. at 362.  But 
the support for human rights and rule of law by Americans through legal education of Latin American 
lawyers at U.S. law schools, links between American or international human rights specialists and their 
Latin American counterparts, and funding for human rights litigation in Latin America, failed to 
transform the field of human rights advocacy in Latin America.  See id. at 369.  In Chile, for example, 
politically well-connected but out-of-power elites, who also happened to be lawyers, joined the 
American-funded effort to promote human rights.  See id. at 359.  When regime change occurred, these 
elites reentered conventional politics, abandoned their legal careers, and the human rights movement in 
Chile collapsed.  See id. at 368–69; Dezalay & Garth, supra note 8, at 55–56.
49. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 372.
50. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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settings;51 types of clients;52 relationships that are formed in professional or “epistemic” 
communities (groups sharing common views about causes of and solutions to social 
problems);53 opportunities to use law in combination with other forms of political, 
moral, and symbolic power;54 and global resources available through networks, 
conferences, education, travel, funding, and other relationships.55  Contexts that 
seem to make cause lawyering risky to observers may nevertheless offer attractive 
possibilities for a career in law when viewed in the vernacular.56  Even where courts, 
the profession, and law are weak, lawyers may mobilize a variety of resources, 
including symbolic and political resources, religious institutions and values, or other 
cultural systems and networks of support, either within the state itself or outside the 
society.  They may deploy collective action that circumvents the legal system or 
strategically exploit limitations of the legal system.  Thus, the seemingly limited 
overall prospects for law in opposing the state may not tell the whole story of the 
production of legal advocacy.  
 In sum, neither the view that associates cause lawyering with liberal legalism nor 
the view that identifies cause lawyering with the dangers of “speaking law to power” 
from a position of opposition to the state captures all the ways that Thai lawyers may 
pursue a moral vision of society.  The lawyers that were interviewed for this study 
collectively pursued careers spanning more than half a century and virtually every 
significant social movement in Thailand.  Their careers have not all been cut from 
the same cloth or shaped by shared purposes.  Yet all have been influenced by the 
legal culture formed during Thailand’s unique, non-colonial path toward development: 
first as a modernizing monarchy, then as an evolving “bureaucratic polity” in which 
all leading political factions had power within the state administration,57 and, most 
recently, as a society struggling to establish democratic political institutions.   It is to 
the narratives of the careers of four Thai social justice lawyers that we turn next in 
51. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 1, 13–17, 46–50 
(2005).  
52. See Heinz et al., supra note 7, at 7. 
53. See Stephen Meili, Latin American Cause-Lawyering Networks, in Cause Lawyering and the State 
in a Global Era, supra note 3, at 307, 311.
54. Scholars in the United States are discovering that lawyers for social movements often support a savvy 
mixture of legal and non-legal strategies determined by political opportunities and collective decision 
making.  See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational 
Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments 
and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 261, 276 (using the term “new style” public 
interest litigation as suggested in Susan M. Olson, Clients and Lawyers: Securing the Rights 
of Disabled Persons (1984)).    
55. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 36.
56. See supra note 39. 
57. See Kevin Hewison, Introduction: Power, Oppositions, and Democratization, in Political Change in 
Thailand: Democracy and Participation 1, 3–5 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997).  Thailand’s 
bureaucratic polity concentrated power in Bangkok and incorporated all powerful elite groups, including 
the rising Sino-Thai commercial families who were not part of the hereditary aristocracy.  See id.
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order to understand the forces that have shaped their work and their ability to 
influence the exercise of government power. 
IV. FOUR GENERATIONS OF THAI SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERS
 In this Part we will meet four Thai cause lawyers and learn about their careers, 
beginning not only with their earliest thoughts about law but also a description of 
the decisions, actions, and experiences that have carried them to the present.  The 
lawyers’ lifetimes span Thai history from the 1920s, when the oldest was born under 
the absolute monarchy, to the present, under Thailand’s eighteenth constitution.58 
The oldest entered the practice of law in 1951, under a military dictator, and the 
youngest in 1999, in a democracy just two years after the ratification of Thailand’s 
most liberal constitution, the so-called “People’s Constitution.”  Changes which 
occurred over this eighty-year period, in the structure and institutions of government, 
economy, and society, interweave the stories of the lawyers.  Their narratives, while 
representative of their contemporaries in no strict sense, have been chosen to illustrate 
the effects of these changes during four broad time periods which I call “generations.” 
The time periods I use to define a generation have been determined by the changes 
that seemed most significant to the lawyers themselves, rather than by wholly 
arbitrary criteria such as evenly spaced cohorts.  Seminal political and social events 
led to experiences which define particular generations in Thai culture (much like 
World War II or the “60s” define generations in the United States) and which 
radically changed the opportunities for deploying law within the society.  The four 
generations are thus a convenience used to compress the more complex and complete 
story of law and institutional development that lies at the core of this research.   
 In subsection A, I introduce each narrator and sketch Thailand’s legal history. 
This serves two purposes: to justify the generational markers I use to contextualize 
each career and to provide essential institutional and political history for the reader. 
In subsections B through E, I tell a more complete story about each of the lawyers 
and fill in additional historical details.  
 The four narratives intersect at important points.  While several of the lawyers 
know each other, none knows all of the others.  Yet an important theme is that these 
careers have been inf luenced not only by historical context but by the actions of 
earlier generations that have shaped the field of social justice law practice.  Thus, the 
narratives are presented in order, tracing both history and the cumulative effects of 
earlier generations.
 Unlike the studies of human rights lawyers’ careers conducted by Dezalay and 
Garth, I am not concerned here with an elite group aspiring to become members of 
an inner circle in the “field of state power.”  These Thai lawyers had little expectation 
of high status and were motivated in part by the much more prosaic goal of finding 
a career.  They found ways to sustain careers validated by some measure of self-
58. See generally Wikipedia: Constitution of Thailand, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_
Thailand (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) (providing a well-researched and referenced overview of Thai 
constitutional history).
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respect and effectiveness.  Yet like the careers of the potential power elite, careers of 
typical social justice lawyers also provide a window into law’s legitimacy, independence, 
and power.
 Previous research provides little guidance for predictions about how social justice 
law practices may emerge or not emerge, succeed or fail, in rapidly developing new 
states, as a means to limit the power of government.  The inductive approach adopted 
in this article attempts to sketch two interrelated stories.  The first is a story about 
the process that draws individuals into a difficult line of work and into a profession 
unknown prior to the late nineteenth century (and unknown to most well into the 
twentieth century) in the hope of influencing government and social change.  The 
second story is about the consequences of this decision, not only for the lawyers 
themselves but for the profession, and potentially, the “field of state power.”  The 
contributions of the individual narrators, however small, must be viewed as part of a 
broader process, and I will point out, in a speculative concluding section, where I 
think their contributions are reflective of trends in the broader process.
 A. The Historical Context of Four Generations of Thai Social Justice Lawyers
 Until the nineteenth century, governance in the feudal society of Siam, later 
renamed Thailand, was adapted to the needs of a powerful monarch and his local 
subordinates who exercised traditional authority.  The structure and substance of 
monarchical rule spread from other parts of South and Southeast Asia, but, unlike 
the remote, infallible, and semi-divine rulers of India and Cambodia, Siam’s 
monarchs embraced a version of Buddhism that obligated them, as well as their 
people, to obey its precepts.59  Buddhism, still the religion of more than ninety 
percent of Thailand’s people,60 teaches that karma—the accumulated merit of an 
individual—determines individual fate.61  The concept of karma underpinned 
Thailand’s traditional social hierarchy.62  In the sixteenth century, hierarchy was 
formalized by the system of sakdina, in which each member of society, from members 
of the royal family to the lowliest villager, had a prescribed place based on their 
relationship to the king.63  While sakdina became a relic after the overthrow of the 
absolute monarchy in 1932, modern Thai society remains hierarchical.64  Its monarch 
is still revered for his virtue and, many Thai believe, his sacred power.  The influence 
of Buddhism remains strong, but has fragmented in an era of mass society, 
59. See Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 7–8, 19–20; Frank E. Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The 
Interactions of Religion and Law in Thailand, 28 Law & Soc’y Rev. 433 (1994).  
60. Central Intelligence Agency, The 2008 World Factbook (2008) [hereinafter  World 
Factbook], available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/th.html.
61. Thanet Aphornsuvan, Sitthi in Thai Thought, 6 Thai Culture 273, 288–89 (2001).
62. See Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 19–21.
63. Id. at 15
64. Scholars debate the nature of hierarchy in modern Thailand, but there is a great deal of evidence of its 
inf luence, reinforced by institutional remnants adapted to modern politics and economy.  See Munger, 
supra note 29, at 466–67.  
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consumerism, and middle class ambition.65  Still, although much has changed, the 
institution of the monarchy and the hierarchy it represents still survive and their 
influence in both social relationships and politics is apparent.66  
 In the pre-constitutional era before 1932, King Chulalongkorn’s (1853–1910) late 
nineteenth century “defensive modernization” of the Thai state included gradual 
Westernization of its legal institutions: establishment of courts, adoption of civil and 
criminal codes, and bureaucratic administration.67  State administration remained, as 
before, highly centralized, answerable to the king, and remote from the vast majority 
of ordinary Thai, although the aristocracy was pushed to assume administrative roles 
replacing their hereditary authority.  The legal system King Chulalongkorn 
established was influenced by both civil and common law institutions, although the 
prevalence of code law, absence of citizen participation, and limited authority for 
judicial review suggest the predominance of civil law.68  Since the early twentieth 
century, Thailand has had civil and criminal courts of general jurisdiction and, more 
recently, specialized courts for domestic, labor, and commercial and intellectual 
property cases.69  
 From its establishment, the purpose of the legal system was to support the 
centralization of the king’s authority, and the need for lawyers was limited largely to 
the affairs of state or dealings with foreign governments.  King Chulalongkorn sent 
his son, Prince Rajburidirekrit (known as Prince Rabi), to study law in England, and 
on his return Prince Rabi established the first law school, which was for sons of royal 
families who were expected, like other members of the aristocracy, to serve in the 
king’s government.70  Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, private domestic 
business and commerce were undeveloped and dominated by Sino-Thai merchant 
families.71  The largely rural population knew little about law or lawyers.  
 A few firms with foreign-trained lawyers were located in Bangkok to serve 
foreign business interests, but the number of lawyers in private practice was small.72 
As the inf luence of Western culture grew, families with means increasingly sent 
65. See Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 224–27; Peter A. Jackson, Withering Centre, Flourishing 
Margins: Buddhism’s Changing Political Roles, in Political Change in Thailand, supra note 57, at 75.
66. See Craig J. Reynolds, Introduction to National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today 
(Craig J. Reynolds ed., 2002).
67. Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 47–80.
68. See Frank C. Darling, The Evolution of Law in Thailand, 32 Rev. of Pol. 197 (1970); Borwornsak 
Uwanno & Surakiart Sathirathai, Introduction to the Thai Legal System, 4 Chulalongkorn L. Rev. 39, 
40–50 (1986).  
69. See Shinya Imaizumi, Political Reform and the Constitutional Court of Thailand, in Law, Development 
and Socio-Economic Changes in Asia 227, 229 (Naoyuki Sakumoto et al. eds., 2003). 
70. Prasit Kovilaikool, ASEAN Law Ass’n, Part VI The Legal System of Thailand 533–37 (1995); 
David K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand 204–08 (1969). 
71. Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 92–96.
72. There are few reliable sources on early practitioners.  In 1960, the first Thailand Yearbook reported 1700 
licensed lawyers (including those who were inactive), Statistical Yearbook, supra note 27, at 159, or, 
for comparative purposes, one lawyer for every 15,000 people (population 26,257,916).  National 
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their sons abroad to be educated, typically to France or England.  Some, who were 
sons (and later daughters) of royalty, the tiny middle class, or successful Sino-Thai 
merchant families, returned with an education in law.  Thai who were educated 
abroad, and especially those with law degrees, were likely to serve in the government 
after returning to Thailand.  Alternatives to entering government service were few. 
Prestige and position were not won by entering private practice.  A law graduate with 
an aristocratic name might become an important bureaucrat or win a coveted position 
in the Foreign Service.73   
 The monarchy’s historical compromise with Western power opened Thai legal 
culture to the influence of powerful new values, including the concepts of equality 
and human rights.74  These new values, along with other elements of European 
culture, were embraced by some elites, but the attraction was by no means universal. 
Nevertheless, a slow transformation began which contributed to overthrow of the 
absolute monarchy by elites educated in the West, including a group of military 
leaders, and creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1932.75  
 Pridi Banomyong, the intellectual force behind the elite revolution that overthrew 
the absolute monarchy in 1932, made establishment of a public university to educate 
government officials one of his first priorities.  In 1933, the University of Moral and 
Political Science (later renamed Thammasat University) opened, offering an 
undergraduate curriculum in law and other subjects, intended to educate future 
government officials in their responsibilities to the nation and its people.  Pridi, 
imbued with many Western values, expected the majority of graduates to enter public 
service and to help establish a new mission for government—being responsive to the 
needs of the people—but his attempt to establish a parliamentary democracy was 
short-lived.76  Generals who made up the majority of the revolutionary party had 
ambitions of their own and soon pushed Pridi aside, promoting a new nationalism 
that combined the authority of the monarchy, the symbolic unity of the nation, and 
the sacred power of Buddhism under a central administration closely connected to its 
powerful leaders.  From 1947–1973, Thailand was ruled by military dictators.77
Statistics Office: Thailand, http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/pop2000/prelim_e.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 
2009).  
73. Interview with Virada Somswasdi, Dir. of Women’s Studies, Chiangmai Univ., in Chiangmai, Thailand 
(June 28, 2007) [hereinafter Virada Somswasdi Interview].  
74. See David M. Engel, Mich. Papers on South & Southeast Asia, No. 9, Law and Kingship in 
Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn 59 (1975). 
75. Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 109–21.
76. See id. at 123, 143–44.
77. See David Morell & Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, 
Reaction, Revolution 5 (1981).  At the beginning of World War I, a strongly nationalist-and 
military- dominated government renamed the country Thailand.  Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 
4, at 132.
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 In this period of military dictatorship, Thailand’s government formed a 
bureaucratic polity.78  While diverse elite factions were incorporated, and politics 
were pursued within the bureaucratic state, the bulk of the population was excluded 
from meaningful political participation.  Moreover, there were few effective legal 
checks on the exercise of power by the Thai bureaucracy.  The Thai Parliament 
tended to delegate broadly to ministries which used their authority to make policies 
without effective parliamentary oversight.  The courts were deferential to bureaucratic 
discretion in making policy.  With little oversight, Thai ministries were vulnerable 
to the self-interest of bureaucrats and outside inf luence, qualities that allowed 
alliances of the powerful traditional elite, military, and wealthy business families to 
grow through favoritism and corruption.79  
 Thongbai Thongbao, perhaps Thailand’s first social justice lawyer, began his 
career in the era of Thailand’s bureaucratic polity.  He graduated in 1951 from 
Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law, Thailand’s first law school for commoners. 
It is not difficult to understand how Thongbai’s origins in poverty, exposure to 
teachers steeped in public service, and belief in Buddhism contributed to an early 
embrace of social justice.  Buddhism, together with Thammasat University’s public 
service values, emerges from Thongbai’s narrative as an important source of guiding 
principles.  His identity as a lawyer, and the dictators’ abuse of both the concept of 
public service and the virtues of the dhama ruler to whom they owed allegiance, 
explain his passion for justice.  More extraordinary is his early decision to devote his 
life to the legal defense of victims of government abuse at a time when there were 
few lawyers in Thailand and hardly any willing to oppose a ruthless military 
dictatorship.  
 The second generation of social justice lawyers entered the legal profession under 
radically different circumstances.  The critical turning point for them occurred in 
1973, although social unrest leading to the events of that year began long before.80 
The student uprising against the dictatorship in 1973 and its aftermath marked a 
watershed in cause lawyering and in Thai anti-authoritarianism generally.  Not only 
was the rising tide of discontent and radical idealism among students validated, 
shaping the careers of many, but Pridi’s public service ideals for legal education were 
reinforced and reshaped, especially at Thammasat, to emphasize the transformation 
of civil society as well as government.  For later generations, Thammasat became the 
most desirable law school for candidates with a commitment to social causes and the 
source of a disproportionate number of new cause lawyers.81  
78. See Hewison, supra note 57, at 3.
79. See Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 150–55.
80. See id. at 180–89; Craig J. Reynolds, Thai Radical Discourse: The Real Face of Thai Feudalism 
Today (1987).
81. Graduates from Thammasat University form the largest group among my interviewees, and the second 
largest group graduated from Ramkamhaeng University.  Cause lawyers who graduated from 
Ramkamhaeng may be numerous in part because the university is very large, and many more law 
students graduate each year from Ramkamhaeng than from other universities in Bangkok.  More 
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 Equality and democracy have particular appeal for the generation of Thai who 
lived through the 1960s era of brutal military rule and anti-communist terrorism 
that led to the student uprising of October 14, 1973, the “October Revolution.”  In 
the 1960s, Thailand’s economy experienced its first “take-off.”  The military 
dictatorship received massive American foreign aid and philanthropy as well as 
World Bank guidance.82  During the Vietnam War, Thailand became a staging area 
for U.S. military intervention in Vietnam as well as efforts to create a free market 
bulwark in Thailand against the spread of communism.  Many members of Thailand’s 
growing educated elite opposed the Thai government’s authoritarianism and 
corruption and supported the October student uprising.83  The uprising toppled the 
U.S.-supported military government and created a brief window for political 
liberalization.  The years 1973–1976 became a watershed of social and political 
change—a true “constitutional moment.”84 
 Military rule returned in 1976 after a second bloody confrontation between the 
military and students because, in part, a wavering middle class favored stability, even 
if it meant the return of an authoritarian government.  The political ambivalence of 
the Thai urban middle class toward popular democracy, and its comfort with 
authoritarian governments under some circumstances, is a continuing theme of Thai 
politics.85  Government persecution of the October activists drove many of them to 
join the communists in the countryside.  By the end of the 1970s, a more moderate 
authoritarian regime attempted to heal this rift by welcoming the dissidents back 
into Thai society.86  Many members of the “October generation” continue in active 
roles in universities, government, and private enterprise.  
 Among the most inf luential members of the October generation is Somchai 
Homla-or, a second generation social justice lawyer who came of age as a student 
leader at Thammasat University before and during the uprising.  Like other students 
of his generation, when the uprising toppled the dictatorship and democracy followed, 
he became a teacher and organizer in the countryside.  When the dictators returned, 
he f led to the jungle to seek protection.  Somchai returned from the jungle in 1979 
significant for purposes of my research, virtually all cause lawyers from Thailand’s Muslim south 
attended this law school.
82. See Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 140–55.
83. See Morell & Samudavanija, supra note 77, at 3–6 (1981) (providing a classic account of this period).  
84. Id. at 4.  See generally Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 5–7 (1991); Bruce 
Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 8, 117 (1998) (providing an explanation of his 
theory of transformations of the United States Constitution).  In brief, Ackerman argues that the 
fundamental relationship between the American people and their government has changed at critical 
moments in history, not only through alterations of the founding document, but also through widespread 
acceptance of new understandings brought about by fundamental and powerful social change.  Three 
such moments have occurred according to Ackerman: the Civil War, the Great Depression, and the civil 
rights transformation signaled by Brown v. Board of Education.  Id.
85. See, e.g., Benedict Anderson, Withdrawal Symptoms, in The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia, and the World 139 (1998); Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, 263–65.
86.  Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 196–97.
763
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
to a greatly altered political landscape.  During the 1980s, under stable, military-led 
governments, the economy again grew rapidly, attracting Japanese and Western 
investors.  The October generation’s legacy grew through the efforts of returning 
activists, like Somchai Homla-or, who helped build a vibrant NGO movement in 
both the poorer parts of the countryside and in urban centers.
 A third generation of social justice lawyers graduated in the shadow of the events 
of 1973 with the new political and social landscape of the 1980s—relatively benign 
military leaders and a booming economy.  With the end of the Cold War, communism 
receded as a plausible threat.  Political space opened as government violence against 
its enemies declined.87  Many lawyers strove to expand this space, but they were by 
no means the only actors who entered this field of opportunity.  Unlike Latin 
America, Thailand was never the focus of a decades-long Cold War campaign by 
U.S. philanthropists for rule of law or human rights reform.  Yet the long-term 
presence of NGO workers and organizers in rural areas indirectly ref lects the 
influence of global funding and activism.  Some TANs became facilitators of political 
consciousness and organizers of social movements among the rural poor.88  The 
continuing presence of NGO workers, with some support from TANs and 
international aid agencies, may have strengthened popular consciousness of social 
injustice but may not necessarily have raised consciousness of rights, in part because 
of the influence of traditional culture in the construction of popular justice claims in 
local contexts.89  Thai have always been ambivalent about perceived foreign 
intervention, and as a result, not only was the American and Vietnamese intervention 
increasingly unpopular, but the NGO movement was (and is still) widely perceived 
as foreign-supported and, therefore, “non-Thai.”
 Surachi Trong-ngam is a third generation social justice lawyer who graduated 
from Thammasat’s law program in 1987.  Early in his career he worked for NGOs 
while he accumulated experience.  In 1994 he and three other lawyers formed a 
private social justice law practice.  In 2000, with the aid of a network of activists and 
foreign funding, he became coordinator of an environmental litigation project.  Many 
third generation lawyers, representing a transitional cohort of social justice lawyers, 
87. See id. at 188–89; Ji Giles Ungpakorn, Challenges to the Thai N.G.O. Movement from the Dawn of a New 
Opposition to Global Capital, in Radicalising Thailand: New Political Perspectives 289 (Ji Giles 
Ungpakorn ed., 2003).  
88. See, e.g., Prudhisan Jumbala & Maneerat Mitprasat, Non-governmental Development Organizations: 
Empowerment and Environment, in Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, 
supra note 57, at 195; Bruce D. Missingham, The Assembly of the Poor in Thailand: From 
Local Struggles to National Protest Movement 33–41 (2003); Amara Pongsapich, Thai Political 
Space for Advocacy, in Breaking Through: Political Space for Advocacy in Southeast Asia 216 
(Paredes et al. eds., 2007).  My interviews also revealed the presence of American-trained grass roots 
organizers from the Philippines who conducted training for NGO staff members and lawyers working 
with poor communities in the 1980s and 1990s.
89. See Missingham, supra note 88, at 215–20; Frank E. Reynolds, Legitimation and Rebellion: Thailand’s 
Civic Religion and the Student Uprising of October, 1973, in Religion and Legitimation of Power in 
Thailand, Laos, and Burma 134 (Bardwell L. Smith ed., 1978). 
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combine the idealism of the October generation with new career opportunities in a 
growing private sector.
 A military coup in 1991 provoked yet another confrontation, this time with a 
much stronger, widely mobilized “civil society” sector, which resulted in the 
restoration of civilian rule and a strong rejection of military intervention.90  The 
same sector led a popular debate about expansion of constitutional rights and 
democratic government.  In its final stages, the efforts of these advocates for change, 
combined with institutional failures contributing to the currency crisis of 199791 and 
international pressure for “structural reform,”92 led to adoption, with widespread 
popular approval, of a liberal, rights-oriented constitution in 1997.93
 Until 1997, Thailand’s constitutions played only a small role in its jurisprudence; 
courts rarely referred to the constitution and only a handful of cases involving 
constitutional questions were decided against the government.94  The 1997 Thai 
Constitution, however, created a politically independent Constitutional Court with 
power to render binding constitutional interpretations and an Administrative Court 
that for the first time offered an accessible forum for challenging the decisions and 
policies of the vast bureaucracy.95
 The fourth generation is comprised of lawyers whose careers began after the 
adoption of the 1997 Constitution.  During this generation, the NGO movement 
has continued to strengthen and expand in part a result of new forms of foreign 
subsidy.  After the Cold War ended, the United States was far less interested in 
sending military aid to Southeast Asia, but aid has continued and reflects, as always, 
American social concerns and policies, including drug interdiction and human 
trafficking prevention.
 Duean Wongsa is a fourth generation social justice lawyer.  She graduated in 
1999 with a law degree from Chiangmai University and followed the tide of law 
graduates entering the global economy, choosing employment for two years as a 
lawyer with a Japanese business firm.  At present, she is a staff lawyer with a 
trafficking prevention NGO funded by the U.S. government but created by a long-
90. See Benedict Anderson, Elections in Southeast Asia, in The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia, and the World, supra note 85, at 272; Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 
243–46.
91. The IMF interventions in 1997, together with foreign criticisms of “crony-capitalism” and “patron-
clientelism,” were considered Eurocentric misperceptions by many Thai.  See Baker & Phongpaichit, 
supra note 4, at 256–57.
92. See id. at 254.  See generally Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, Thailand’s Crisis (2000) 
(discussing the role of the IMF and more broadly discussing what worked and failed from both an 
economic and social perspective).
93. See Michael Kelly Conners, Framing the ‘People’s Constitution,’ in Reforming Thai Politics, supra note 
29, at 37.  
94. See Imaizumi, supra note 69, at 229–37.
95. Borwornsak Uwanno & Wayne D. Burns, The Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Process, 32 U.B.C. 
L. Rev. 227, 243 (1998).
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time Thai-British organizer and philanthropist.  Her career reflects the maturation, 
in a certain sense, of social justice lawyering as a viable career.
 After ten years of popular democratic rule, a military coup in September 2006 
imposed a government pattern that many Thai thought had been rejected in 1992. 
Yet the coup was bloodless and was welcomed by middle class, urban Thai because it 
ousted a prime minister who, although popularly elected, was perceived as corrupt 
and overreaching.  The coup leaders restored civilian rule under a new, popularly-
ratified constitution after a little more than a year, but many Thai have viewed the 
recent coup as a step back from constitutionalism and rights. 
 Thailand’s rapidly growing economy has created opportunities for lawyers and, 
perhaps, for cause lawyers.  Access to university level education has increased steadily 
since the mid-twentieth century, supplying both the private sector and the government 
with educated workers.96  Law is an increasingly popular undergraduate major,97 and 
the number of licensed attorneys is growing rapidly.98  In 1985, Parliament established 
an independent Lawyers Council of Thailand with exclusive power to license 
96. See Anderson, supra note 85, at 149–52; Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: 
Development, Security, and Foreign Aid 49–70 (1990).  
97. As in Great Britain and much of Europe, Thai law schools are four-year undergraduate institutions. 
The first public law school, which later expanded to become Thammasat University, was established in 
1933 as an “open” university, introducing a radically democratic concept of education, especially 
professional education, in a country where universities had been administered by and largely for the 
benefit of its elite.  In most of rural Thailand, primary education was provided to males only, typically 
by literate monks at nearby temples.  Secondary education was neither free nor locally available in much 
of the country.  In the 1960s, a faculty of law was added to Chulalongkorn University, the country’s 
oldest university.  See Kovilaikool, supra note 70, at 538.  In the late 1970s, Thailand’s first open-
admission law school, Ramkamhaeng, was founded.  Id.  Over the past twenty years, the number of 
public law schools has increased rapidly.  The Ministry of Education (MOE) records statistics for 
twenty-four public universities and other institutions of higher education offering first law degrees 
(undergraduate degrees).  See MOE Annual Report, supra note 28, at 27.  A web search suggested that 
an equal number of private schools may offer first law degrees.  While graduates in Law are not 
uniformly reported separately from graduates in Political Science in the MOE’s reports, the numbers 
suggest an enormous rise in popularity of law among undergraduates beginning in the 1980s.  During 
Thailand’s boom in the 1980s, law became the second most popular field of study.  Chira Hongladarom, 
Unemployment in Thailand, in Thailand on the Move: Stumbling Blocks and Breakthroughs 
(Suchart Prasithrathsint ed., 1990).  The table is reproduced in Tienchai Wongschisuwan, The Political 
Economy of Thailand: The Thai Peripheral State, 1958–1988, at 378 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, SUNY Binghamton) (on file with author).
98. The careers of practicing lawyers, public prosecutors, and judges are distinct.  The term for a practicing 
lawyer is frequently translated as “barrister,” although unlike the British use of this term, it covers all 
licensed lawyers, including those who perform functions as solicitors as well as those who appear in 
court.  As in many civil law legal systems, candidates seeking to become public prosecutors or judges 
must pass a separate, much more difficult examination, and usually sit for this exam early in their 
careers.  Thus, judges and prosecutors do not normally come from the ranks of practitioners.  Most 
judges are career bureaucrats receiving assignments which are, as a formal matter, based on merit and 
moving up a hierarchy of authority and desirability (e.g., being assigned to an area closer to Bangkok is 
generally considered more desirable).  As described previously, the number of practitioners has increased 
dramatically in the past twenty-five years, paralleling the rise in other rapidly developing Asian societies. 
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
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attorneys.99  The Lawyers Council of Thailand has utilized its mandate to establish 
a legal assistance bureau to provide a clearinghouse for lawyers representing 
individuals and movements in human rights cases, although the scope and effect of 
this role awaits careful study.  The governing board of the Lawyers Council has 
included human rights lawyers like Somchai Homla-or, who became the first 
chairman of its Human Rights Committee after the adoption of the 1997 
Constitution.  Surachai has served on both its Environmental Law and Human 
Rights Committees.  
 Yet the maturation of social justice law careers does not reflect the complexities 
that Thai social justice lawyers confront.  For example, in spite of explicit recognition 
of human rights by the 1997 Constitution, and the growing support for human rights 
lawyers from the Lawyers Council of Thailand, an attorney associated with the 
Council, widely known for his human rights advocacy on behalf of the Muslim 
minority in southern Thailand, was assassinated by police in 2004.  The Lawyers 
Council responded by issuing a public declaration calling for an investigation into 
and the punishment of the perpetrators, yet the government has taken no action to 
identify or prosecute his abductors.100  The assassination is not an isolated case, and 
the government’s use of violence to silence advocacy for rights, however infrequent, 
cannot be ignored by Thai attorneys.     
 Authoritarian rule has roots in Thai legal culture.  Professor Frank Reynolds 
contrasts fundamental values underlying the political discourse of constitutional 
monarchy in Thailand—often described in terms of a trilogy of concepts: monarchy, 
nation, and religion—with the underlying values that dominate American political 
culture, termed “utilitarian individualism.”101  While American political culture grew 
from a tradition of individual freedom of conscience and dissent, treating 
institutionalized authority with suspicion, Thai political culture grew from a tradition 
far more respectful of the authority of traditional and spiritual leaders.  Yet, the 
culture of deference to traditional leaders has not precluded objections to government 
99. A Thai Bar Association has existed since the reign of Rama VI (1910–1925), but, in the views of 
practitioners, it came to be dominated by Thailand’s career judges and prosecutors.  Its current 
responsibilities are principally educational: preparing applicants who sit for the examinations for these 
positions.  Kovilaikool, supra note 70, at 539; Malee Pruekpongsawalee, Thammasat Clinical Education 
and the Delivery of Legal Services: A Historical and Personal Perspective, in Educating for Justice 
Around the World: Legal Education, Legal Practice, and the Community 118, 124–27 
(Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper eds., 1999).  Practitioners pushed steadily for their own professional 
association as private sector growth increased their numbers and economic independence.  In 1985, 
Parliament established the separate Lawyers Council of Thailand to oversee and speak for practicing 
lawyers.  Kovilaikool, supra note 70, at 546–47.  Since 1985, graduates with a law degree qualify for 
the practice of law by attending a course of classroom preparation for law practice provided by the 
Lawyers Council followed by a six month apprenticeship.  However, graduates who have already 
accumulated more than a year of apprenticeship experience or who have served as public prosecutors or 
judges are exempt from these requirements.  Id.
100. See Working Group on Justice for Peace, Human Rights Under Attack: Overview of the 
Human Rights Situation in Southern Thailand 10–11 (2008), available at http://thailand.ahrchk.
net/docs/HRunderAttack.pdf.
101. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 433; see also Aphornsuvan, supra note 61, at 277–78, 286.
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action based on the welfare of the Thai people, and advocates for popular movements 
have been able to claim that those in power are responsible for promoting the people’s 
welfare.102  Equality and democracy (if not precisely representative democracy)103 also 
have a strong appeal, not only among elites, but among the Thai people generally, 
and growing support for these values is credited, in part, for the strong popular 
protests which toppled military rule in 1992104 and propelled constitutional reform in 
1997.105
 Some Western scholars have suggested that Thai culture encourages respect for 
leaders, avoidance of direct conflict, and reluctance to invoke law against persons 
who possess authority.106  According to this theory, patriarchal social norms encourage 
clientelism and networking to secure social position and benefits rather than 
contentious interaction with government officials and private power holders.  If such 
a generalization is true, one might argue that Thai cause lawyers will prefer mediation 
or cooperation with the government over threatening to invoke formal legal process 
in order to preempt or oppose the government or other power holders.  This 
generalization, like the claim that the Thai embrace “Buddhist values,” is controversial 
and best evaluated in the context of particular conflicts and the work of particular 
cause lawyers. 
 B. Thongbai Thongbao—The People’s Lawyer
 Thongbai Thongbao, a first generation cause lawyer, was born in 1926 to a family 
of poor rice farmers in Ubon Rachiatari (Thailand’s poorest region located in the 
northeast) and raised by his five siblings.  During his long career, he has become 
Thailand’s best known human rights lawyer.  He looks back to humble origins to 
explain his mission to fight on behalf of the poor and oppressed.  Thongbai knew 
little about law and had never met a lawyer, but he was encouraged to choose law by 
a young law graduate from Thammasat who taught in his high school and put into 
practice the public service values he had learned at the university.  The young teacher 
102. See Jackson, supra note 65; Reynolds, supra note 59.
103. See Michael Kelly Connors, Democracy and National Identity in Thailand, at ch. 8 (2003) 
(claiming democracy and liberal western political values are often embraced as an ideal and taken to 
mean government which respects the needs and best interests of the people—government for the 
people).  But this rhetoric and its underlying values are manipulated to support authoritarian 
governance—government for the people but not by the people, rather government by the better elements 
of society.
104. Anderson, Elections in Southeast Asia, in The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism , Southeast 
Asia, and the World, supra note 85, at 265, 271–72 & n.8.
105. See Imaizumi, supra note 69, at 228.  
106. See, e.g., Fiona Haines, Globalization and Regulatory Character: Regulatory Reform 
After the Kader Toy Factory Fire 52–56 (2005).  Haines’ theory does not predict an absence of 
conf lict, but rather suggests that Thai power holders also prefer “corporatist” consolidation of their 
power and exclusion of rivals rather than public conflict or violence.  Id. at 55.  Yet Thai society displays 
plenty of overt conflict.  As Indonesia scholar Daniel Lev commented with respect to another Asian 
culture said to avoid conflict, “[i]f Indonesians seek harmony and avoid conflict, they have not been 
good at it.”  Lev, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
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told him, “Even poor people like you can study in Bangkok.  You can work to put 
yourself through school.”  With some help from his family, and by working and 
living like a pauper, Thongbai graduated from Thammasat in 1951 with a degree in 
law.   
The Northeast is very poor and exploited by many people. . . . [W]ith my 
own eye, I have seen they have taken people’s real estate, something like that.  
So I think if I study law I think I can do something good for the people. . . . I 
thought if I am a lawyer I can fight the police; I can fight many people.  
Because to be a lawyer, as a people’s lawyer I can fight them.
 Thongbai did not learn how to help poor people in law school, and he could not 
become a lawyer until he had served as an apprentice to a licensed lawyer.  When he 
found an apprenticeship there was nothing for him to do, and he earned no money. 
He was forced to live in a Buddhist temple, which charged nothing.  He worked as a 
reporter to support himself.  Journalism, he said, was a good way to criticize the 
government and earn a living at the same time.  
 Work as a reporter led to his first arrest, not for his reporting, but because one of 
his friends was arrested under the anti-communist law for joining a peace movement. 
Thongbai had not participated in the peace movement and was released after three 
days.  He then attempted to defend his friend in court but failed miserably, he says, 
and his friend was given a long jail term.  
 For the next seven years he worked primarily as a reporter.  In 1958, Thongbai 
joined a group of journalists touring China.  During his absence from Thailand, a 
coup brought to power a brutal and virulently anti-communist general.  Thongbai 
was arrested when he returned from China, and spent the next eight years in jail 
fighting his own case and those of other prisoners.107  
I enjoyed being in jail. . . . [A]s a political prisoner I could go on practicing 
law.  I had applied for my license—I had it in 1958.  In jail I was teaching law 
to the prisoners.  They are farmers.  Even if they graduated from university 
they knew nothing about the law.
 Thongbai not only defended his fellow prisoners in court, he organized them to 
fight to improve the prison’s abominable conditions by appealing to families for 
support, convincing prison officials to allow the prisoners to cultivate prison grounds 
so they could grow food and supplement their inadequate diet, organizing recreational 
activities, and forming a legal defense committee with seven other imprisoned 
lawyers.108  
107. He won his case before a military court in 1966, but only after the death of the dictator and a public 
discrediting of his regime.  1984 Ramon Magasaysay Award For Public Service: Biography of Thongbai 
Thongpao, http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/BiographyThongpaoTho.htm, (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Thongbai Biography].
108. See id.  In 1975, two years after a student-led uprising toppled the dictatorship, he published a 
best-selling account written during his Lad Praow prison years entitled Lad Praow Communists.  Id.; see 
also Reynolds, supra note 80, at 36.
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 In 1960, while in jail, he filed a suit on behalf of all of the prisoners for false 
arrest under Thai law and also under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Three years later a civilian court ruled in the prisoners’ favor under Thai law.  All of 
the prisoners were released except Thongbai and two others who were charged with 
new offenses under the Anti-communist Act and brought before a military tribunal. 
Thongbai again brought a false arrest claim, initiating a four-year stalemate.  When 
an acquittal seemed likely, following a regime change, the government offered to 
drop all charges against him and many similarly situated inmates if, in return, he 
dropped his suit for false arrest.  If his freedom alone had been at stake, Thongbai 
would have continued the legal fight, but he could not refuse an offer which would 
benefit so many others.  
 Thongbai entered prison as a journalist and part-time lawyer, but he left with a 
mission to practice human rights law and with a reputation that brought him political, 
labor, and human rights cases.  Over the next thirty years, many of the most 
celebrated cases involving political prisoners, social movement leaders, and outspoken 
critics of government found their way to him, enhancing his reputation.  
 Eventually he set up a small office in a poor section of Thon Buri (across the 
Chao Phraya River from Bangkok).  He invited younger lawyers to join him as 
volunteer apprentices, and eventually the number grew to about twenty.  He has 
worked with many contemporaries and younger lawyers, but few could sustain his 
level of commitment to practicing on behalf of the poor who often could pay very 
little for their services.  
You should know that the Thai people are very kind people.  They give me 
some money . . . .  But the people who have no money . . . when they come to 
see me they bring durian, when they come from the Northeast they come 
with a bag of rice or carrots . . . .  So, I am happy.  Maybe only in Thailand 
you can do that . . . to live like that . . . because they are Buddhist.  They tell 
me “Thongbai if you practice law in the United States you will become a 
millionaire.”  But I did not want to do that.  No lawyer practices like me at 
the time, or now.  I think, how can I live like that?  But I can live very easy at 
that time.  We have rice to eat.  We have everything.  If you could see my 
house, it is a small room.  One hundred fifty baht per month—five dollars at 
that time.  Because I know nothing about the safety of the lawyer at that 
time.
 Even in recent times, some Thai lawyers representing movements which officials 
deem threatening have been arrested, attacked, and even assassinated.  But Thongbai 
has never been concerned about his safety as a defender of political prisoners.  
I feel I did good things.  People don’t want to kill me.  Even after all that, the 
military and the police were not against me.  Because they recognize I do 
good things.  I am for justice.  Even after October 1976, people leave for the 
jungle.  But I stay [in Bangkok] all the time.  And I fight for the communists.  
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I fight for the reporters [charged with] lèse-majesté.109  I fight for the farmer 
and I fight for the communist.  
Thongbai has at times stood carefully apart from politics.  He did not join supporters 
of the student uprising in 1973, although he supported the opening for democracy in 
principle.  “I did not join the uprising.  So that is why I can stay [out of the jungle]. 
What can I do?  That is why the police and high ranking military officer trust 
me. . . . I am free.”
 He led a team of lawyers who defended students that were arrested and charged 
with crimes during the reimposition of military rule in 1976, negotiating a spectacular 
retreat by the government.  Having brought the case to near-victory, he forced the 
prime minister to refer the prisoners’ fate to the Parliament which granted a broad 
amnesty to all who had f led to the jungles to avoid arrest and prosecution after 
1976.110  
 After the October activists returned from the jungle, some were charged with 
offenses under the Anti-communist Act for their subsequent activities.  Thongbai 
now had many cases in military court where he enjoyed practicing because the rules 
of evidence were more relaxed.  After concern about communism declined, Thongbai 
continued to handle high profile cases for outspoken critics of government and made 
several trips abroad to defend the rights of ordinary Thai facing harsh criminal justice 
in other countries.111 
 During thirty years of law practice, Thongbai had become the leading defender 
of activists persecuted by government.  In 1996, he became one of the members of 
the drafting committee of the “People’s” Constitution, and, in 2000, a member of 
Thailand’s first elected Senate.  
 Thongbai’s defense of political prisoners made him famous, but the small law 
firm he maintained for most of his career was typical of the handful of social justice 
lawyers whose careers began near mid-century and took shape under repressive 
governments.  The untold story of the social cause lawyers of his time, whether they 
represented poor people or opposed Thailand’s first military dictatorships in court, is 
all the more interesting because of the absence of a colonial bar (as in Malaysia), a 
common law adversarial system (as in South Africa), or leadership by the judiciary 
(as in India).  Of the 1700 lawyers reported in the 1960 census, only a handful were 
educated in Europe, and Thongbai was not one of them.  Even without a tradition of 
professional independence or rule of law, Thai lawyers may nevertheless have been 
inf luenced indirectly by Western professional ideals or more directly by sources 
within Thai culture—or both.  However, Thongbai’s statements contrasting his law 
practice and the practices of New York lawyers, together with repeated mention of 
109. Lèse-majesté is a crime defined as affronting the dignity of the monarchy.  The critical element is an 
affront to the monarchy, usually through speech, rather than the veracity of the representation.  The 
crime has long since ceased to be meaningful in Europe, but continues to play a role in Thai politics.  See 
David Streckfuss, Kings in the Age of Nations: The Paradox of Lèse-Majesté As Political Crime in Thailand, 
37 Comp. Stud. Soc’y & Hist. 445 (1995).
110. See Thongbao Biography, supra note 107.
111. Id.  He received the prestigious Ramon Magasaysay Award for Public Service in 1984.  Id.
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the importance of Buddhism in maintaining relationships with clients, complicate 
any such inference.  Further, in 1984, he expressed a characteristic Thai rejection of 
mimicry of foreign social mores when he replied to a proselytizing North Korean 
communist at a conference.
I am a Buddhist and the Lord Buddha teaches us to make decisions on our 
own, from our own study of the situation, and not to decide by the word of 
others, even if they are old and scholarly.  I agree that your way may be good 
for you, but for Thailand it is different.  We have a different way. 
 Thongbai’s professional mission could have many sources, including belief in 
Pridi’s values of constitutional and public service or emulation of the lawyers in 
Western societies, but Thongbai’s reference to Buddhism in that reply and in referring 
to his relationship with poor clients of his law practice is perhaps more suggestive. 
Buddhism is a core element of Thai identity.  Thai Buddhism places a unique burden 
of moral leadership on Thai rulers, exemplified by their beloved king.  Conversely, 
scholars have suggested that repugnance for immoral or corrupt leaders, more than 
desire for greater rule of law or participation, underlies the mass participation in the 
uprisings that have overthrown dictators (as well as the support for military coups 
which have served the same purpose).112  Thongbai’s idealism and particularly strong 
belief in resisting unjust, oppressive rulers, could have multiple sources, including his 
education at Thammasat (which inculcated moral leadership as well as rule of law), 
Buddhism, and perhaps least plausibly, emulation of Western professional 
independence.
 After the October 1973 student uprising, Thongbai played an increasingly 
important role by training younger lawyers and defending victims of government 
abuse.  The student uprising toppled the American-backed dictatorship, opening 
Thailand to popular dissent, encouraging social movements, and bringing back the 
possibility of constitutionalism—a government committed to basic principles of 
conduct.  The political opening influenced the aspirations of new law graduates and 
created opportunities for them.
 C. Somchai Homla-or—The “October Generation” Lawyer
 Near the end of his four years as a law student at Thammasat University in 
October 1973, Somchai Homla-or and his university schoolmates propelled a conflict 
with the government into a confrontation and a mass-movement.  Many of his 
generation were drawn to left idealists like Mao Tse-tung and in the early 1970s 
students at Thammasat had rediscovered and circulated the writings of the 
independent Thai Marxist Jit Promlak. 
 Somchai is the son of middle class parents who grew up in Ayutthaya, the old 
capital of Siam, north of Bangkok.  His grandfather was a farmer, but his father had 
a university education and had worked as an accountant for the government and for 
private business.  Even before 1973, he was drawn to discussions of social problems 
112. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 59, at 440–44.
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while in law school, as were many of his classmates.  He helped organize the “Rule 
of Law Club,” which recruited law students113 to study social conditions in Thailand 
and prepared them for visits to the countryside to talk with villagers.114  
 After graduation, he worked for a federation of farmers in the poor, rural 
northeast and as a school teacher.  The federation was organized by students who 
had been involved in the October 14 uprising.  Their purpose was to help mobilize 
the farmers to achieve land reform.  Somchai helped investigate cases of fraudulent 
transfer of title to speculators.  
They occupied and used the land for generations, and they discovered that 
their land is under the title deed of one of the chiefs of the education 
department.  The people were shocked.  So they fight.  We checked the 
document.  We found a long time ago when these farmers were young, officers 
came and said they were surveying but didn’t say they were issuing title deeds.  
So the farmers cooperate.  We helped them write a petition to the government 
in which we described these facts.  And that mobilized the farmers. 
Thailand had no administrative courts at that time, and a petition to the Council of 
State, which oversees the state bureaucracy, was one of the few remedies available.  
[Y]ou have to mention some legal principle—land title, going back to the 
king—like public domain.  The concept is that the king gives use of the land 
to you, not ownership.  The concept of private ownership is introduced by the 
West.  King Rama V introduced private land to Thai society . . . [and] 
allocated land titles to members of his family.  In principle, if not developed 
during ten years, it must be returned to [the] king.  The person who actually 
exploits the land should have ownership—that was their argument.
The government set up a committee to investigate the claims of the farmers, and 
eventually the farmers won return of their land titles from the family of the powerful 
bureaucrat who had stolen them, because, Somchai commented wryly, “the family 
was probably not powerful any more!”  
 Somchai was arrested when a military dictatorship returned to power in 1976. 
Released on bail, he f led to the jungle to join thousands of other October activists 
113. This recruitment process occurred until undergraduates were moved from Thammasat’s main, central 
Bangkok campus to the Rangsit campus on Bangkok’s outskirts and could no longer be recruited by 
upperclass members.  Interview with Prinya Thewanaruemitkul, Vice-Rector, Thammasat University, 
in Bangkok, Thailand (Feb. 29, 2008); Interview with Prinya Thewanaruemitkul, Vice-Rector, 
Thammasat University, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 14, 2008).  
114. In the 1960s, the Rector and Chair of the Economics Department of Thammasat, Puey Ungpakorn, 
had been instrumental in organizing a Graduate Volunteer Service, on the model of a similar British 
organization, which placed university graduates in community-based organizations in the countryside 
to give them better knowledge of their country and to encourage careers in public service.  See Thanapol 
Eawsakul, Puey Ungphakorn: A Biography, in Collected Articles by and About Puey Ungphakorn: 
A Siamese for All Seasons 361, 366 (5th ed. 2000).  According to one source, it is likely that this 
organization was made possible by funding from The Asia Foundation.  See Sulak Sivaraksa, Loyalty 
Demands Dissent 79, 116 (1998).  In the 1970s and 1980s, the Thai Volunteer Service, managed by 
Puey Ungpakorn’s son Jon Ungpakorn, placed students with non-governmental organizations in an 
effort to channel students’ careers in a similar direction and to support the growing NGO movement. 
Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok (Dec. 21, 2006); see also infra note 119.   
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who escaped arrest in the camps of communist cadres on the Thai-Laos border.  He 
soon became dissatisfied with the communist movement in the jungle and secretly 
returned to Bangkok to work underground.  He was arrested and remained in jail for 
a few years until a general amnesty was declared in 1979.
 Though support for dissent against military rule was growing within Thailand, 
the international community showed little interest.
At that time [there were] very few international organizations. . . . We
know  about Amnesty International because they sent the team from Oxford 
to the trial of the political activists, the student leaders that were arrested in 
1976 and detained for almost three years before being released.
A Thai NGO, the Union for Civil Liberties (UCL), was formed around 1974 by 
European educated academics to support the human rights of participants in social 
movements.115  Somchai worked for the UCL after his release from jail in 1980, and 
the UCL had close connections with Amnesty International (AI) which was then 
monitoring Thai military treatment of refugees on the Thai-Cambodia and Thai-
Laos border.
I helped Amnesty International to investigate and the National Security 
Council was very angry with me.  It became big news for weeks but they did 
not mention me by name, but they implied it was me when they gave an 
interview . . . blamed me, harassed me, somebody follow me.  The investigation 
became big news . . . .
Somchai was linked, like Thongbai, with the communist party, but the government 
perceived his involvement in a very different way because he had f led to the jungle. 
Anticipating arrest for his work with AI, he f led again in 1980, this time to Hong 
Kong.  It was his first trip abroad.  During three years in exile, Somchai became a 
fellow for the Asian Human Rights Commission and a trainee for Human Rights 
Watch.  He studied human rights in other Asian societies.  Later, he also met human 
rights advocates in the United States.  These contacts provided resources that 
transformed his career.  
 When he returned to Thailand, he worked as a voluntary chairperson of the 
UCL and joined the Internet Law Firm, which was inspired by a Washington, D.C., 
human rights organization named Human Rights Internet which published a 
directory of human rights organizations in the days before the Internet.  In addition, 
Somchai established a Human Rights Committee for the Lawyers Council of 
Thailand116 immediately after the ratification of the 1997 Constitution in order to 
gather all of the cause lawyers in one place for mutual support.  Their legitimacy as a 
professional organization grows from the Council’s mandate to take cases on behalf 
of the needy.
115. See infra pp. 785–86.
116. See Amnesty Int’l, Human Rights Defender in Thailand: Somchai Homlaor (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/human-rights-defender-thailand-somchai-
homlaor-20081209.
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The criteria . . . are not restricted to these [poverty cases], but . . . we mainly 
focus on the cases that have an impact on the public, for example, the cases 
that really violate the basic principles of human rights.  Because we want to 
maintain and promote the principle of human rights, so any case that may 
revoke or weaken the principle of human rights we will take.  The case that 
may have some impact on or affect the vast majority of the people or a big 
group of the people we will take.  We want to empower the people, not just 
only to solve the immediate problem.  Because we believe that democracy 
cannot be built without the people’s participation . . . so we identify our role 
is one of support for the people’s movement.  
Within the committee we set up subcommittees on different kinds of rights, 
and in the subcommittee we have lawyers and people from NGOs and 
academics, because we want the lawyers to work together with them.  We 
want to be different from the mainstream lawyers . . . you cannot work 
alone.
 Somchai has faith in the courts, and he urges young lawyers to raise constitutional 
rights and human rights in the cases that they litigate.  
Judges are independent from the executive branch . . . but they are not 
independent from the king. . . . They are very proud that they act on behalf of 
the king. . . . And to this extent they can check the executive branch.  There 
is no direct link between the other two powers and the judiciary.  They are 
quite independent from the other branches.  Except some corrupt judges!
 He also understands the deeper problem of establishing rule of law—the behavior 
of the entrenched bureaucracy.117  A court decision may be required not only to 
vindicate the small adjustment of registration regulations to conform with the intent 
of the law, but also to empower a lower level government officer to use initiative to 
make the change. 
 Somchai is concerned that there are so few young lawyers in his network who are 
self-sustaining; one of his goals is to increase that number.118  He notes that young 
lawyers are difficult to recruit.  “They are not our generation.  Our generation is 
117. He also trains government lawyers and at times uses a different strategy for advocacy to change 
government actions, namely by using his good relations with some ministry officials to propose cabinet 
resolutions favoring a broad and uncontroversial human rights policy.  An example would be a resolution 
entitling every child to an education, and then using the resolution to pressure local administrators to 
address the need for improved education.
118. In 2006, when I first interviewed him, Somchai said, somewhat regretfully, that his Law Society 
network was sustained mostly by an aging corps of only about eighty lawyers countrywide.  The limited 
interest of the vast majority of private practitioners in supporting, much less working on behalf of, social 
justice, human rights, or improvement of the rule of law in Thailand has been a persistent concern. 
Somchai recalled just one practicing lawyer who participated in the first years of the UCL, and he left 
quickly because it was not his thing.  While my interviews suggested that the most active core was far 
smaller—at most fifteen or twenty whose names appeared again and again as organizers, trainers, and 
leaders of various projects, many others helped with particular projects or handled a small number of 
cases.  Still others, not part of the network, work in the outlying provinces advising activist groups or 
NGOs and providing criminal defense for protesters.  Still others serve as leaders, staff members, or 
counsel to NGOs.
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more political.”  The growing disparity between opportunities for private lawyers for 
businesses and the self-sacrifice required to pursue human rights litigation is as much 
a deterrent for third and fourth generation social justice lawyers as it was for 
Thongbai’s.  A new internship program funds a few law graduates entering a training 
program run by Somchai and his colleagues, but they receive only 3000 baht (about 
$100) per month as a stipend.119  He believes that neither the Thai government nor 
international funding will sustain their work for long.  Somchai has continued to 
maintain and extend his international network, allowing him to tap international 
funding for his projects and coordinate them with international advocacy.120
 Prior to 1973, radical lawyers like Thongbai found a way to make a modest living 
while providing services to a poor, underserved, and needy urban population.  These 
were the exceptional few who survived in spite of the constant threat of jail for 
“communist” activities, as Thongbai’s experience illustrates.  
 After 1973, cause lawyers found new roles.  A group of activist first generation 
practitioners founded the Legal Aid Center Institute to provide services to poor, 
needy, and politically marginalized groups who lacked legal representation.121  Two 
academics educated in Europe formed the UCL, an organization focused on the 
rights of causes seeking to open political space for popular movements.122  After 
graduation, activist second generation law graduates, like Somchai, became 
organizers, but they delayed making decisions about the paths of their legal careers 
because they had f led to the jungle.  Upon returning, their activism continued.  The 
returning group took up careers shaped by idealism; some becoming organizers in 
rural areas,123 others joining NGOs spun off by staff members of the Legal Aid 
Center Institute who had been mentored by Thongbai’s generation,124 and still others 
119. There were nineteen trainees in the program in 2006.  Somchai focused recruitment on the need for 
human rights lawyers for Thailand’s beleaguered Muslim communities.  The training was to be held in 
the south, the area of Muslim concentration, and many of the participants were from Muslim families. 
Another program, the Thai Volunteer Service, was formed in 1980 with a grant from the Asia 
Foundation to support the NGO movement by providing a small two-year subsidy to university 
graduates working for NGOs.  In 2006, Thai Volunteer Service began supporting law graduates working 
for NGOs.  Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 21, 2006); Interview with 
Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 18, 2007); Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in 
Bangkok, Thailand (July 8, 2008); see also supra note 112.
120. For example, Somchai’s Cross-Cultural Foundation funnels money to many of his projects and the 
committees or NGOs that maintain them.  Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra attempted to 
block foreign funding f lowing to Thai NGOs that he found politically troublesome by adopting 
regulations making direct funding of Thai NGOs from foreign sources illegal.  However, Thai 
foundations may legally accept foreign funding, and in turn these foundations can fund NGOs. 
Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (July 8, 2008); see also Amara Pongsapich, 
Thailand, in The International Guide to Nonprofit Law 304 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 1977). 
121. See Ruangrawee Pichaikul & James R. Klein, The Asia Foundation, Legal Literacy for 
Supporting Governance Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and Poverty 
Reduction 146–47; see also infra note 154 and accompanying text.  
122. See infra p. 785–86.
123. See Ungpakorn, supra note 87, at 290–91, 295; Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 88, at 198.  
124. Pichaikul & Klein, supra note 121, at 147; see also infra note 153.
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entering government or politics.  In the 1980s, a tidal wave of new NGOs marked 
the rise of “civil society” in Thailand and laid a foundation for the rapid overthrow of 
the 1991 coup and the movement supporting the adoption of Thailand’s liberal 
constitution in 1997.125
 Thus, like Somchai, many cause lawyers in the first and second generations 
helped to institutionalize activist roles as providers of direct support for marginalized 
and poor individuals, as well as for social movement organizations.  They also 
provided apprenticeships for the third and fourth generations.  
 D. Surachai Trong-ngam—The “Environmental” Litigator
 Surachai Trong-ngam entered Thammasat University a little less than a decade 
after the uprising in October 1973 and is a member of the third generation of cause 
lawyers.  The Vice Rector of Thammasat University, a prominent scholar and political 
pundit who is a half-generation younger and great admirer of Surachai Trong-ngam, 
showed me a picture of Surachai when he was in law school in the mid 1980s.  In the 
picture he has long hair, torn jeans, a red book, and a cloth bag—he looks like a 
Berkeley radical.  During the period when the photograph was taken, Surachai led 
groups of Thai law students to the rice fields near Bangkok to learn about the 
people.  
 Surachai has “attitude” that is expressed in his class-conscious description of his 
family, his admission of his own naiveté and that of other law students who went to 
the countryside to lecture villagers on politics unprepared to help with their legal 
problems, his continuing commitment to represent social causes, even though his 
commitment has  meant a life in poverty, and his belief in the causes of the clients he 
represents in their fights against the government.  
 Surachai became radicalized during law school by students and teachers who 
believed in human rights and by a personal journey through which he embraced the 
legacy of 1973.  A thoughtful self-critic, Surachai commented on the naiveté of law 
students armed with a superficial knowledge of Marxism, expecting to have 
something useful to tell villagers.  He credited the visits with awakening him to 
Thailand’s social problems, its pervasive poverty and inequality, and the realization 
that law school had ill prepared him to understand the legal problems of the rural 
poor or to use the law to help them.  
 Surachai entered law practice in 1987 and worked for an NGO in Chiangmai, in 
Northern Thailand, doing “community research” by assessing problems of the youth 
and providing social services.  While at this job, he gained further experience with 
rural communities reinforcing his belief that more specialized expertise was needed 
to help them and that an NGO specifically for that purpose would be useful.  
 Surachai moved to Bangkok where he was employed for a year or two by the 
Friends of Women Foundation, an NGO created by a lawyer from the October 
generation.  In 1994, Surachai joined three other lawyers to establish a small public 
interest law firm, Meesit Law Firm.  
125. See Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 219–20.
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The purpose was to help the lawyers survive well in their profession and so 
continue to do social [cause] work.  They did not want to rely on sources of 
funding from foreign countries or on being an NGO in order to do social 
work.  They wanted to find some other ways through being in the legal 
profession to do social work.
Each lawyer had experience in social cause practice—labor union representation, 
slum advocacy, criminal law—and Surachai brought his experience as a litigator for 
the Friends of Women Foundation and his interest in representing communities like 
those he had seen near Chiangmai.  From the outset, the problem for the Meesit 
Law Firm was financial survival.
We try to get some work from the business sector but by nature the business 
is about problems related to villagers’ cases.  We found it difficult to build 
good connections with business.  We could make money from cases that were 
passed on by other lawyers or through a network of relatives and friends.  We 
thought that if our strength was doing socially important work we should 
create this image and try to [sell] it to the public . . . .  We thought about our 
strength in doing social work, and if we want Meesit to grow, we could try to 
use our strength to promote Meesit and get social cases in other areas.
Another challenge for Meesit is the reproduction of this kind of law practice. 
Surachai acknowledges that it is important to recruit and train younger lawyers, but 
this commitment adds to the burden of supporting the partners.
We provide opportunities to learn.  Most of the people here were involved in 
social activities.  We might not be able to fully support the next generation 
lawyers.  If they can survive here, they must have fewer financial constraints 
and family obligations . . . .  Many might not be able to continue to be here 
and will have to leave.  
 In 1999, Surachai returned to Thammasat University to earn a diploma in Public 
Law, which prepared him to represent clients in the new Administrative Courts 
created by the 1997 Constitution.  Surachai was then recruited by Somchai Homla-or 
to join his Human Rights Committee and handle litigation brought to the Committee 
by NGOs on behalf of communities resisting private development or government 
projects.  
 In 2001, the New York based Blacksmith Institute proposed to fund an 
environmental litigation project in Thailand by creating an NGO called EnLaw.126  
126. Interview with Penchom Saetang, Dir., Campaign for Alternative Industry Network, Nonthaburi, 
Thailand (June 30, 2008) [hereinafter Penchom Interview].  (Ms. Penchom is a senior activist who 
helped establish EnLaw.)  Surachai said that an “ideal model” of something like EnLaw had been 
discussed within his network for some time, but his network had few international contacts in the 
environmental law area.  Counterparts in other societies are learning to litigate through networks with 
environmental litigators elsewhere.  Before EnLaw was established, a global network called ELaw 
linked environmental litigators together.  ELaw is an environmental litigation project organized by 
Professor John Bonine at the University of Oregon.  But Surachai’s contact with lawyers associated with 
ELaw has been limited in part by the fact that he speaks only Thai, and Elaw has had no contact with 
other lawyers in Thailand.  Blacksmith’s proposal was first conveyed to Surachai’s network of friends 
and NGO contacts by a staff member at Human Rights First.  A senior member of the network later 
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EnLaw has subsequently received small amounts of funding from other foundations 
and the Thai government, and it is closely linked to Surachai’s law firm, which 
provides the lawyers who work for EnLaw.  EnLaw has helped ease the Meesit Law 
Firm’s financial problems, but only temporarily because the Blacksmith funding, like 
so many grants from international sources, was a one-time grant to build “capacity” 
in a firm that was expected to become self-sustaining.  Surachai explains, however, 
that the clients of his firm cannot afford to pay him because they are poor.  They 
believe in him because he is a community activist, not because he is a lawyer for 
hire—to ask them for payment or part of the meager compensation they receive from 
court judgments would undermine their trust.  Surachai has carefully considered 
alternative ways to sustain his work.  In addition to occasional non-cause work, he 
thinks that the NGO network may be able to provide long-term funding.  
 Like Somchai, Surachai thinks litigation has become increasingly important for 
lawyers defending social causes, especially since the ratification of the 1997 
Constitution. 
Due to the fact that the establishment of the Constitution in 1997 including 
the trend toward development of administrative law, these make it easier for 
the people to oversee the state’s power by creating more channels for oversight 
that the people’s movements lack . . . .  Until now, the legal process has been 
employed to limit the people’s rights.  Now, people have their own rights to 
use the legal process.  The legal process is a channel for people to fight.  And 
we think we can back them up on this part.  
Some of the important cases that have propelled Surachai’s reputation appear on the 
Blacksmith Institute website as illustrations of the global fight against pollution.127 
To Western observers, Surachai may seem to support the most conventional form of 
the rule of law, an “American-style”128 environmental litigation firm that “plays for 
rules.”129  He litigates like American-style public interest lawyers, and his litigation 
seems to focus on a narrow regime of rights—environmental pollution.  But Surachai 
does not view this as narrowing his role as an activist.  He views his and EnLaw’s 
mission quite differently from Blacksmith’s emphasis on the natural environment. 
approached Surachai about becoming coordinator of EnLaw.  In spite of his limited connections with 
the international environmental law movement, Surachai has received more than adequate expert advice 
from his supporting network of Thai scholar-friends.  
127. See Blacksmith Institute: Projects, http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/regions/se_asia (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009).
128. By “American-style” I mean an aggressive use of law to initiate litigation to change the rules under 
which Thai ministries operate, to expand the statutory interpretations applicable to private firm liability, 
or to establish constitutional protections.  Perhaps one other firm has recently emerged that aspires to 
such practice, but Surachai is far ahead of the curve.  Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, 
Thailand (July 8, 2008).
129. The term was given meaning by Marc Galanter’s seminal essay, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 97–102 (1974).  The concept refers to 
use of the court’s policy making authority by choosing to litigate for the purpose of establishing 
precedent rather than merely resolving a conflict or seeking a specific remedy.  Id.
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Surachai’s mission is supporting community self-determination, and the starting 
point is always a community movement. 
It’s true that these groups arise as a result of our explanations about how to 
exercise their rights, letting them see the benefit of legal ways of fighting, 
both to protect and to reclaim.  If they see the benefit, they can have us work 
on litigation.  This is the work of networks of villagers, NGOs, and lawyers, 
right?  They have to understand their movement’s friends . . . .  Mostly, if 
they are strong, they tend to be sued anyway . . . .  They already tend to be 
involved in many risky actions.  Most of our work supports villagers when 
they are about to be sued.  Even though we definitely do reactive cases, we 
also want to do proactive cases . . . .  It’s the movement’s action, so we have to 
do it in the form of a group.  
He assumes that his own transgressive politics are aligned with his aggressive 
litigation.  
 The problems encountered by Surachai sustaining his law practice for social 
change, including a paucity of fee-paying cases, the mismatch between occasional 
support from foreign sources and his own goals, and difficulty attracting and 
supporting younger lawyers, are typical and help explain the slow growth of cause 
lawyering among private practitioners.  Although the number of lawyers in Thailand 
has increased sharply during the last twenty-five years,130 the number of cause lawyers 
in private practice, like Thongbai and Surachai, has not.  Aging radical lawyers in 
small firms constitute the core of Somchai Homla-or’s country-wide network.131 
While the first generation had few choices other than private practice, after 1973, a 
much wider range of employment opportunities existed for idealistic law graduates, 
including working for NGOs or combining NGO employment and private practice. 
The rising number of cause lawyers after 1973 is due in large part to employment by 
NGOs.  The new cause lawyers are salaried, at least in the early stages of their 
careers, and many have been supported in part by NGOs.  Somchai’s Human Rights 
Committee, which has become a focal point for cause lawyering and its reproduction,132 
130. See infra note 151.  The take-off period occurred in the late 1970s, shortly after the 1973 uprising.  See 
MOE Annual Report, supra note 28 (providing statistical data on the number of Thai lawyers).
131. It is possible that a few new cause lawyering firms have formed outside of Bangkok.  See supra note 128. 
I recently learned of another “environmental” law firm like Surachai’s, which is less well known and has 
kept the Bangkok network at a distance.  Although I have asked many sources about this, only a few 
provincial cause lawyers have surfaced—perhaps ten or fifteen—but all part time and none with the 
commitment of Somchai or Surachai to build a movement among lawyers or to become identified with 
social movements generally. 
132. For information on the formation of the Lawyers Council of Thailand (originally named the Law 
Society), see Kovilaikool, supra note 70, at 546–47.  The creation of the Lawyers Council by 
Parliamentary Act in 1985 may not only ref lect the desire of practitioners to have their own organization, 
but also the symbolic importance of an independent bar in the modern nation state.  See, e.g., Heger 
Boyle & Meyer, supra note 24, at 71.  In addition to the growing importance of private lawyers in one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world and its popularity as a field of study, the liberal authoritarian 
governments of the 1980s attempted to simultaneously open up political space and to manage it by 
encouraging participation without full democracy.  The Lawyers Council may be viewed as an attempt 
to foster and manage an important aspect of civil society, access to the courts.  This goal is ref lected in 
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has depended on its relationships with NGOs to channel the most important cases to 
the Committee for consideration.  This loop between human rights activism by 
lawyers and NGOs has tightened in recent years because most of the youngest 
members of Surachai’s network are associated with NGOs or work with NGOs.133  
 E. Duean Wongsa—The NGO Lawyer
 When I first met Duean Wongsa, she was a young and idealistic twenty-seven 
year old about to embark on her career as an NGO lawyer in Chiangmai in northern 
Thailand.  Today, at thirty, this fourth generation cause lawyer has seen and coped 
with more of the rough side of Thai society than the vast majority of her classmates. 
She has adapted her idealism to the contradictions of working between state anti-
trafficking policies and the needs of young Burmese women whom she “rescues,” 
sometimes against their wishes.  
 Duean’s family has been a source of inspiration.  Her mother worked at menial, 
difficult jobs to support Duean and her older sister.  Duean has a strong feminist 
consciousness of the violence that men perpetrate against women, which may reflect 
her family’s experience, as well as the influence of her law school mentors, activist 
faculty members.
 She attended the then new public law school at Chiangmai University.  Although 
Chiangmai Law School does not have the reputation of the elite Bangkok universities, 
it has an exceptional faculty of activists, two of whom served as mentors for Duean. 
Both of her mentors were third generation cause lawyers with national reputations as 
advocates for northern rural communities, ethnic communities, and other human 
rights causes.  One served on the board of EnLaw, Surachai’s environmental NGO. 
The other, a female professor Duean greatly admired, earned a doctor of laws degree 
at Cornell University, writing her dissertation under feminist law professor Martha 
Fineman’s direction, about the continuing struggle for women’s rights after the 
adoption of Thailand’s 1997 liberal constitution.  
 Duean’s first employer, typical of her generation, was a Japanese business firm 
where her sister worked as an administrator.  She was quickly bored by the work, and 
after two years she searched the Internet for something that meant more to her.  She 
accepted an opportunity to work for a new NGO dedicated to addressing problems 
of human trafficking.134  Trafcord, the NGO she works for, receives some funding 
from the Thai government, but most of its funding comes from U.S. sources: Open 
the Lawyers Council twofold mandate.  It was given authority to license attorneys who met certain 
qualifications, including a test of knowledge and a period of apprenticeship.  At the same time, the 
Lawyers Council was made responsible for providing legal services to needy people and given an annual 
budget to meet this need.  See Kovilaikool, supra note 70, at 546–47.  While the Lawyers Council has 
the appearance of a modern bar association, unlike bar associations in the United States and Europe, its 
political role is very small because the legal profession is still not particularly powerful.  Nevertheless, as 
Somchai explains, in the hands of the right leader, the Lawyers Council has provided a means of 
mobilizing inf luence.  
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
134. She and another classmate are the only two from a class of fifty that are working for NGOs.  
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Society Institute (OSI), World Vision Foundation, and the United States government, 
which provides support through its Embassy in Bangkok.  The Embassy channels 
funding under U.S. programs, such as the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking 
in Persons (G/TIP).135  
 Trafcord is in fact a network of formal and informal relationships among 
government and private agencies which collaborate to identify brothels, rescue women 
who are held in the sex trade against their will, and prosecute the traffickers. 
Collaboration between government and NGO is typical of many NGOs that have 
survived for long periods and remained effective.  As Duean says, it is a necessary 
relationship.  She explained that the NGO’s founders have experience helping 
children and families but no authority to make government officials or brothel 
owners cooperate.  The government has the authority but no knowledge or ability to 
help.  The alliance created by Trafcord may be smoother than in other circumstances 
because the G/TIP program threatens withdrawal of U.S. aid in countries that do 
not comply with U.S. policy.136  
 Employment by the NGO is a stage in her career as well as a cause.  Duean 
explains her cause as providing a service to children, families, and the law—a career 
goal with latitude to allow her to envision moving to a larger NGO in a few years 
where she can assume greater responsibility.  Her long-term goal is to form her own 
NGO or private organization to provide services to families.  Typical of many in her 
generation, Duean can contemplate a career which might not have been possible for 
earlier generations of activists.  
V. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON GENERATIONS OF CAUSE LAWYERS  
 The arc of the career of each of the four social justice lawyers was influenced by 
perceptions and interpretations of the individuals as well as by the opportunities and 
constraints created by their families, institutions, and other relationships.  As 
individuals, the four lawyers are not alike, nor can they be viewed as representative, 
in any statistical sense, of all cause lawyers in the four generations.  Yet their careers, 
considered together, suggest some of the most likely pathways for cause lawyer careers 
in each generation and the social changes that have altered them.  
 In this Part, I will consider the influence of Thailand’s political and economic 
evolution on cause lawyering.  Four broad, overlapping sources of change emerge 
from the career narratives: (A) Thailand’s “development,”137 its economic growth 
together with related changes in education and class structure, (B) the October 1973 
135. See U.S. Government Funded Anti-Trafficking Programs, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/c12606.htm (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing a list of U.S. government funded anti-trafficking programs conducted 
under Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP)).  The initial task force to 
implement such programs was created pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act of 2000 and is presently under the supervision of the G/TIP.  See 22 U.S.C.A. § 7103 (2008).  
136. See 22 U.S.C. § 7104(g) (2006).  
137. By “development” I mean rapid social change along a historical path rather than progress toward a 
particular set of institutions or social goals.
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uprising, (C) the emergence of the 1980s NGO movement, and (D) the international 
f low of resources during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.  
 A. Thailand’s Development
 The longer view afforded by time underscores a parallel between Thailand’s 
modern economic development and the increasing numbers of lawyers (far 
outstripping its population increase).  Thailand’s first public law school was 
established in 1933, opening the profession to anyone qualified for admission.  Nearly 
thirty years passed before a second public law school was established.  In the past 
twenty years, and especially in the last decade, the number of public and private law 
schools has grown rapidly.138  Families of university students have almost always 
preferred to have children enter secure government employment, and law students 
themselves are typically drawn to high-status public careers as a judge or prosecutor. 
Increasingly, students have been attracted to law as an entry point to the rapidly 
growing and globalizing business sector.  As Daniel Lev has observed about similar 
increases in Indonesia and Malaysia, the vast majority of the new recruits are not 
deeply imbued with the values of professional independence or the rule of law.139  Yet 
there are far more cause lawyers in Somchai Homla-or’s extended network than 
there were in Thailand when Thongbai Thongbao began practicing law.140  
 Soon after World War II, the United States replaced England as Thailand’s 
protector and principal benefactor.  Initially this was done to secure the United States’ 
position in Southeast Asia, but it quickly became a Cold War strategy driven by the 
United States’ desire to make Thailand a developed, free market bulwark against 
communism.141  U.S. aid built infrastructure not only to facilitate military needs but 
also to domesticate rural areas that might otherwise have fallen under communist 
inf luence.  The Thai state grew and penetrated areas that previously had only a 
distant relationship to Bangkok, and now had roads, schools, and medical services. 
Major U.S. foundations addressed development of higher education and professional 
training.  The World Bank issued a plan for fiscal management, which was 
implemented by Puey Ungpakorn, Director of the Ministry of Finance, later Rector 
of Thammasat University and a strong supporter of the student uprising in 1973.142  
 Business boomed, and rising expectations began to have an important effect on 
other development policies of the Thai government.  Thailand’s growth created new 
138. See supra note 97.  
139. See Lev, supra note 20.  Thai legal education has been slow to modernize, but the limited role for lawyers 
derived initially from Thailand’s civil law tradition and the historical conservatism of the courts, which 
have contributed little to the development of a profession with a sense of independence or power.
140. Somchai’s Law Society network was sustained by a corps of approximately eight lawyers countrywide, 
see supra note 118, compared to the enterprising three lawyers that began the Legal Aid Center Institute, 
see infra note 153.
141. See Hess, supra note 35, at 320, 322.
142. See Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, Puey Ungphakorn, in Collected Articles by and About 
Puey Ungphakorn: A Siamese for All Seasons, supra note 114, at 35–36. 
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wealth and aspirations for upward mobility by families who desired to see opportunity 
perpetuated for the next generation through better education for their children.143 
American advisors also pressured Thai bureaucrats to improve the education system, 
and American philanthropies invested enormous sums in subsidizing and retraining 
entire university faculties.144  Between 1961 and 1972, university enrollment increased 
from 15,000 students at f ive universities to 100,000 enrolled at seventeen 
universities.145
 Demographic change created a fertile ground for student idealism and 
opportunities for idealism to be put into practice.146  As opportunities expanded, 
middle class expectations also continued to rise, creating a politically precarious 
environment for Thailand’s dictatorship.  While university students like Somchai 
Homla-or discovered new ideals that directed their opposition to authoritarian 
government, Thailand’s emerging middle class wanted economic opportunity, and 
when the dictatorship could not deliver in the early 1970s, they provided crucial 
support for the student revolt in 1973.147  
 A comparison between the number of cause lawyers at mid-century and at 
century’s end is problematic because the very concept of a cause lawyer varies among 
the generations.  Prior to 1973, some lawyers who worked in important positions for 
government shared many of the sentiments and values expressed by Thongbai.148 
While we might pause before calling them cause lawyers, one of the most important 
characteristics of contemporary Thai cause lawyering is its use of insider connections 
143. Id. at 149–52.  Surachai’s career was inf luenced in this way by the expansion in educational opportunities 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  Surachai’s family is poor, but a university education was not beyond his 
grasp or, more importantly for general political development, his family’s expectation.
144. See Hess, supra note 35, at 329, 335, 339.  Aid from the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and 
Carnegie Foundation transformed higher education in Thailand.  Puey Ungpakorn, Chair of 
Thammasat’s Economics Department from 1964 to 1972, began with a department of six which grew to 
over one hundred faculty members by the time he resigned.  See Eawsakul, supra note 114, at 365. 
During the same period, U.S. philanthropies opposed U.S. support for pro-U.S. dictatorships in Latin 
America by funding human rights, ref lecting a political split among elites in the United States.  While 
there was opposition to the war in Vietnam, there was far less opposition to U.S. support for Thailand’s 
repressive military governments.  Philanthropies may have viewed Thailand as underdeveloped and 
needing basic social welfare and educational reforms that would lead to development of a free market 
economy and democracy.  Put another way, Thailand may have drawn less concern about human rights 
because it was perceived as unready for them while South American societies were perceived as 
fundamentally European in origin and closer to the United States in culture and politics.  Amnesty 
International sent observers to the student trials in 1976.  Interview with Thongbai Thongbao, in 
Bangkok, Thailand (June 22, 2008).  Additionally, congressional hearings in 1977 concerned the 
wisdom of continued arms shipments but not human rights issues in Thailand.  See Ewasakul, supra note 
114.
145. Anderson, supra note 85, at 149.  During this decade, professional occupations increased more rapidly 
than any other occupational group.  Id. at 150 tbl. 7.1.
146. See id. at 154.
147. Id.
148. Confidential interview with former high ranking government prosecutor, in Mahasarakham, Thailand, 
(June 26, 2008).    
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to accomplish what would be otherwise impossible through the courts.  Whether 
such insiders who share some of the objectives of traditional cause lawyers are truly 
capable of “speaking law to power” raises difficult questions about cooptation of 
dissent.  The issue is particularly difficult conceptually and empirically in Thailand 
where until mid-century the existence of a bureaucratic polity meant that all elite 
factions were employed by, or otherwise closely linked to, the state and its 
administration.
 After the 1973 student uprising, political idealism carried law graduates in many 
different directions, but not into the private practice of law.  Many of the most radical 
students in the uprising thought the human rights discourse of some of the professors 
who supported them was too conservative and too Western.149  The legal profession 
began its rapid growth in the late 1970s, but this rapid growth in the overall number 
of lawyers did not necessarily mean a similar increase in the number of cause 
lawyers.150  Undoubtedly, the general opening of Thai society, more than political 
idealism, generated a surge in the number of lawyers entering private practice.  The 
same opening created an opportunity for Somchai and others to use their legal 
training to help the socially oppressed and to found institutions that promoted the 
use of law to support social movements.151  Soon, however, many of the most radical 
law students, like Somchai, f led to the jungle, postponing any thought of a 
professional career.  
 But of course that is the point.  Before 1973, few individuals trained in the law 
who sympathized with opponents of government chose to invest in a career that 
involved deploying the law against the state.152  As time passed, and changes occurred 
149. Human rights advocated by some Thammasat faculty, as well as liberal democratic ideas about 
development supported by Puey Ungpakorn, Rector of Thammasat (who was a protector and supporter 
of the students), were considered too Western by many students who were inf luenced by the models of 
liberation closer at hand in Vietnam and China, and who embraced Maoist political theory.
150. In 1960, there were fewer than 2000 legal practitioners in Thailand.  Between 1970 and 1975, the 
number increased by a little more than 125 lawyers a year from 2541 to 3177.  After 1975, the number 
of lawyers increased to about 7000 in 1980, or more than 750 each year.  Statistical Yearbook, supra 
note 27, at 159.  The rate of increase is currently in the range of 3000 new lawyers every year.  There are 
currently over 54,000 licensed lawyers in Thailand (or roughly one fifth the per capita proportion of the 
United States), about twenty percent of whom are women.  See Lawyers Council of Thailand, http://
www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/directory/data/E07-Lawyers_Council_of_Thailand.pdf. (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009).   In 1980, the Ministry of Justice estimated that the number of lawyers was approximately 7000. 
Statistical Yearbook, supra note 27, at 159.  The Lawyers Council registered more than 19,000 
lawyers by the year 1986, the first year after it assumed responsibility for licensing practitioners.  See 
Letter from the Office of the President of the Lawyers Council of Thailand to author (July, 1, 2008) (on 
file with the author).  The take-off in numbers actually began a few years before 1980, just as the 
“October generation” of students who participated in the 1973 uprising graduated and began their 
careers, suggesting that not only was there an increase in students electing to study law, but also, 
perhaps, more graduates from law school were choosing private practice.  See supra note 97.
151. See discussion infra at Part V.C.
152. Other lawyers accompanied Thongbai to prison in the late 1950s, and Thongbai himself trained young 
lawyers beginning in the late 1960s.  Lawyers emerged from the historical shadows to help establish the 
Legal Aid Center Institute and defend students arrested by the military in 1975 and 1976.  Oral history 
suggests that there were no more than a handful of lawyers ready to commit a substantial amount of 
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in the relationship between the state and “civil society,” more roles for cause lawyers 
emerged. 
 B. The October Revolution—From Private Practice to Institution Building  
 Although four years after the uprising the number of new lawyers entering the 
profession began to grow rapidly, many of the most idealistic law graduates from the 
October generation, like Somchai, left Bangkok to work directly with villagers in 
other capacities.  Even though many activist law graduates of the October generation 
postponed their legal careers, radicalization of the profession began immediately. 
The previous generation of embattled private practitioners together with Western-
inf luenced intellectuals formed two organizations to formalize, expand, and 
reproduce a more liberal role for law.  A handful of practitioners from Thongbai’s 
generation established the Legal Aid Center Institute, an organization dedicated to 
providing legal services to poor persons.153  The Institute’s lawyers focused on legal 
assistance, but, equally important, it became the training ground for many of the 
next generation’s activist practitioners and founders of important NGOs.154  
 The UCL, the second institution organized by first generation cause lawyers and 
other activists, radicalized the bar in a different way.  The UCL, also formed soon 
after the student uprising, was founded by a group of Western-trained faculty at 
Thammasat University and Chulalongkorn University.  Its founders were not 
exclusively lawyers.  One of the founders, Professor Saneh Chamarik, educated in 
Britain, became Thailand’s most prominent human rights theorist and the first 
chairman of the National Human Rights Commission.155  Another founder, Gothom 
Arya, a participant in a 1968 student movement in Paris, was a young member of the 
Chulalongkorn University Faculty of Electrical Engineering.  A few years later, 
Gothom founded Thailand’s first human rights organization.156  Soon branches of 
time to assisting victims of the dictatorship, helping rural people oppressed by government or land 
owners, or representing labor unions and social movements.  An oral history undertaken on behalf of 
The Asia Foundation names three lawyers associated with the Legal Aid Center Institute.  See 
Pichaikul & Klein, supra note 121, at 146–47.  During my interview with him, Thongbai recalled just 
a few who helped him defend students at Thammasat University in 1976.     
153. See id.  My interview with the son of one of the founders also suggests that the Institute was focused on 
law practice rather than on community education, policy development, and other activities that have 
characterized many of the “Thai-style” NGOs founded during this period.  The Institute has disappeared 
with the last of its founders in the 1990s.  See id. at 147.  Interestingly, Thongbai was never a part of the 
Institute but attempted to operate his own training program for younger attorneys and even sought 
funding from The Asia Foundation for this purpose in the 1990s.  
154. Id. at 147.
155. See Interview with Saneh Chamarick, Chairperson, Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n of Thailand, in 
Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Saneh Interview].  See generally Office of the National 
Human Rights Commission of Thailand Home Page,  http://www.nhrc.or.th/index.php?lang=EN (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009); Asia Pacific Forum website, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/apf-
member-categories/full-members/thailand (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).  
156. Saneh Interview, supra note 155; Interview with Gothom Arya, Professor, Chulalongkorn Univ., in 
Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 22, 2006).  During the repression following reimposition of dictatorship in 
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the UCL were established by similar groups in other cities, including Chiangmai 
and Ubon Ratchitani.  Thus, both the Institute and the UCL were organized by first 
generation Thai cause lawyers and activists as an expression of their idealism and 
aspirations for the rule of law.  They provided direct support for marginalized and 
poor individuals as well as social movement organizations, and they provided 
apprenticeships for third and fourth generation cause lawyers.  
 To Americans, the English translation of the UCL name may suggest that it is 
Thailand’s own American Civil Liberties Union, but the UCL’s mission has been 
quite different.  Unlike the ACLU, which has focused on protecting freedoms named 
in the American Bill of Rights, the UCL had no national legal charter to orient its 
work nor was the concept of human rights commonly used or generally understood. 
Instead, the UCL supported social movements by, for example, assisting labor 
organizations to organize, educating workers about their rights, disseminating 
information about new rights, and providing criminal defense.  After 1976, its work 
frequently brought it into conf lict with the government and under suspicion of 
communist influence.157
 While the first generation established institutions, the October generation 
pursued a different path that, in the long run, led back to cause lawyering.  Many 
lawyers of the October generation left the university and became organizers who 
sometimes used their legal skills.  Other law graduates, some who had been in the 
jungle, founded NGOs of their own, supporting the rising tide of mobilization in 
poor urban and rural areas.  Still others, particularly those who could attract foreign 
philanthropy, formed policy-directed NGOs, such as the Friends of Women 
Foundation and the Center for Protection of Children’s Rights—and are now senior 
members of the “Thai-style” NGO movement.158  
 Somchai’s career is quite distinct from careers of first generation activist lawyers. 
Inf luenced by his early experience in a powerful social movement, he has self-
consciously grounded his work in a strategy for social change, namely attracting and 
training progressive lawyers to support social movements of the people.  Since his 
exposure to an international community of human rights advocates in the late 1980s, 
he has been key in building a network of human rights lawyers in Thailand.  He has 
divided his energy between mobilizing legal support for important cases, creating 
space for the defense of human and civil rights by networking with friends in 
1976, Professor Gothom formed, with American assistance, the Coordinating Group for Religion and 
Society (CGRS), which was apparently Thailand’s first human rights organization.  CGRS was the 
only domestic human rights organization permitted to function during the repressive post-1976 regime 
and became a training ground for future human rights lawyers.  Interview with Sarawut Protoomraj, 
former CGRS volunteer and currently one of two UCL staff lawyers, in Thailand (June, 2007). 
157. See, e.g., John V. Dennis, Jr., The Ford Found., A Report to the Southeast Asia Regional 
Office of The Ford Foundation on Possible Funding Opportunities in the Field of Human 
Rights and Social Justice in Thailand (May 11, 1987) [hereinafter Ford Foundation Report] 
(on file with author) (recommending funding the Women’s Center at Chiangmai University but advising 
caution with respect to the UCL because its members were not known to work well with government) .
158. For a discussion of “Thai-style” NGOs, see infra Part V.D.3–5.
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government, and reproducing the current generation of activist lawyers through 
training and finding support for younger lawyers.159   
 C. The NGO Movement
 Third generation law students drawn to cause lawyering, like Surachai, entered a 
field that had taken shape through the work of the October generation, especially 
Thammasat University’s own graduates.  Surachi’s career provides an instructive 
illustration because the network of student and faculty ties formed during law school 
continued to influence Surachai’s career long afterward, helping to direct him to jobs 
and to fund his practice.  
 Like many third generation cause lawyers, Surachai had an opportunity to begin 
working as a salaried staff member of an NGO.  He worked first for a “community 
research” NGO in the north, and within a few years, through his network, he found 
a job with the well-established Friends of Women Foundation as a litigator.  Through 
his network of friends he was also working with other NGOs, including Alternative 
Energy Projects for Sustainability (AEPS),160 an NGO that helps communities 
threatened with environmental, social, and economic disruption by Thailand’s 
program for building power plants.  After working for the Friends of Women 
Foundation for a year, Surachai joined a small law firm whose partners had experience 
working for labor organizations, slum movement groups, and other social causes. 
His work for NGOs was a productive apprenticeship for developing basic skills and 
learning about the roles he could play as a cause lawyer in private practice.    
 A few years after joining the firm, Surachai’s network, specifically his contacts at 
AEPS, brought him another opportunity: coordinator for EnLaw, the environmental 
NGO established by the New York-based Blacksmith Institute.  He was selected 
because of his prior work with AEPS and his reputation as a litigator.  Cases which 
he had worked on for AEPS with the support of Somchai’s Human Rights Committee 
became the first projects handled by the new NGO, EnLaw.  Over time, Somchai 
drew Surachai more deeply into the work of the environmental subcommittee of the 
Lawyers Council.  Gradually Surachai became well known in the cause lawyering 
community, and to the public at large, based on his litigation victories161 and the 
close relationship between the Human Rights Committee and the NGO community. 
He has become the “go to” lawyer for anti-development suits based on environmental 
laws.162  
159. Currently he is creating a new foundation which will supplement the salaries of young lawyers who 
cannot otherwise earn a satisfactory living as cause lawyers.
160. A former staff member suggested that funding for AEPS might have come initially from Sulak 
Sivaraksa’s support for environmental causes through the Komol Khemtong Foundation.  Interview 
with Ida Aroonwong, staff member, Alternative Energy Projects for Sustainability (AEPS), in Bangkok, 
Thailand (June 17, 2008).  
161. See Blacksmith Institute: Projects, http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/regions/se_asia (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009).
162. Recently, the Thai government recognized his expertise in environmental law enforcement by offering 
him a grant to conduct research leading to law reform.  Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in 
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 Duean’s career, representative of fourth generation cause lawyers, exemplifies the 
new opportunities the NGO movement has created.  She is a female, salaried NGO 
staff attorney.  While an elite Women’s Bar Association163 has existed for many years, 
there were few female cause lawyers before the 1980s.  This is hardly surprising in a 
male dominated society.  Perhaps what is more surprising is the emergence of women 
in generations three and four (since 1980) as NGO directors and lawyers pursuing 
careers that combine both cause-clients referred by NGOs and private for-profit 
practice.  One explanation for this may be that women’s interests are more aligned 
with the those of a well-established sector of the NGO community—the Foundation 
for Women, the Friends of Women Foundation, the Center for Protection of 
Children’s Rights, as well as NGOs that focus on women workers, prostitution, or 
sex-work.164
 The progress of the NGO movement also ref lects a change in the fourth 
generations’ perception of their role in political movements.  Duean is not motivated 
by the anti-authoritarian political ideology that motivated the first generation of 
cause lawyers, the lawyers from the October generation, and the third generation, 
those like Surachai who embraced the October generation’s legacy.  Surachai (the 
third generation environmental lawyer), like Somchai (the October generation 
institution builder), was motivated by political idealism.  Surachai explained the 
purposes of litigation as a form of support for community movements, not as 
environmental protection.  Environmental law is simply a tool for achieving an 
essentially political objective.  At the opposite extreme, the desirability of salaried 
apprenticeships for NGOs also draws recruits with less desire to be a cause lawyer 
than a desire to gain experience and move on.165  Duean says her responsibilities are 
to the “king and the law.”  She is among the first to view cause lawyering as fully 
inside the mandate of the profession rather than at its margin or in opposition to the 
government.  Cause lawyering, for Duean, if she is indeed a cause lawyer, is a 
“normal” career. 
 D. Globalization and Hegemony
 Among the sources of inf luence on cause lawyers, the hegemony of Western 
ideas and resources has been the most intensely observed and theorized by progressive 
Bangkok, Thailand (June 16, 2007); Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in Bangkok, Thailand (Feb. 
2, 2008); Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 29, 2008).
163. Virada Somswasdi Interview, supra note 73. 
164. This may also ref lect the opportunities available to women.  While the number of women enrolling in 
law schools has greatly increased—now approaching fifty percent—it is likely that as compared to men, 
women’s opportunities to join private firms are more limited.  However, there is no reliable data for this 
hypothesis.  
165. There are, of course, many reasons why a younger staff lawyer would want to move on, such as the 
extraordinarily high work volume and low pay.  These are familiar barriers to recruiting cause lawyers 
worldwide for all but the elite U.S. public interest law firms and foundations.
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scholars.  As described in Part II, some theories place globalization and hegemony in 
a more positive perspective than others.  Risse and Sikkink are among those who 
view hegemonic standards and economic leverage as the engines that move advocacy 
along the spiral path toward human rights compliance.166  Dezalay and Garth, and 
many others, likewise view international resources and pressure as critical leverage in 
human rights empowerment.167  Comparing career narratives permits an examination 
of a wide range of global connections and resources and their direct or indirect 
influence on the indigenous network of advocates.  Consideration of the changing 
paths of careers highlights the critical importance of increasing access to higher 
education.  Comparing careers influenced by a range of funding programs, together 
with their embedded contingencies (such as cooperation with government), restricted 
objectives (forbidding pursuit of other objectives), or an assumption that a few months 
or years of “capacity building” will lead to a self-sustaining “deliverable,” allows us to 
assess the influence of foreign investments on survival of particular advocates, goals, 
and methods of advocacy.168 
  1. Global Resources 
 Globalization is a shifting array of mutual influences among societies.169  In this 
article, the focus will be on policies of governments, philanthropies, and international 
actors (including both networks and organizations) intended to affect the institutional 
performance or development within Thailand.  Aid, expertise, diplomatic pressure, 
and philanthropy f lowing from the United States and the World Bank have 
predominated since mid-century, but European countries, Canada, Australia, and 
especially Japan have also played increasingly important roles.170 
 Global resources play important and varied roles in cause lawyer careers.  Scholars 
Dezalay and Garth suggested that Latin American human rights lawyers required 
global funding and legitimation to survive because law had little legitimacy and little 
independence within the institutional frameworks of the countries they studied. 
From another perspective, Risse and Sikkink, and their collaborators, derived a spiral 
model of global inf luence from case studies, according to which international 
166. See supra text accompanying note 38.
167. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  Dezalay and Garth have argued that Latin American 
political institutions remained relatively closed to independent legal advocacy for empowerment absent 
international connections.  Id.
168. Still other important effects of global inf luence on progressive advocacy are beyond the scope of my 
research, for example, global support for international or private regulatory regimes, or the potential 
undermining of domestic governmental regulatory regimes through bilateral trade agreements enforcing 
the terms of private development by international corporations. 
169. See supra text accompanying note 30.  The evolutionary process is described as three waves occurring 
over many centuries.
170. See Hess, supra note 35 (discussing aid f lowing to Thailand from the United States and World Bank); 
Worapol Promigabutr, The Logic of Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Its Impact on Thailand’s Postwar 
Development (June 1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with 
author).   
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sanctions work in tandem with domestic human rights advocates to “spiral” up 
pressure to increase the space for both rights and advocacy.  While a broader 
canvassing of cause lawyering in Thailand may support these hypotheses to a degree, 
the four narratives examined here suggest important qualifications for both 
theories. 
 As the Cold War ended, many other aid and advocacy organizations entered the 
scene of what was a predominantly American-influenced development.  The attention 
of governments and philanthropies turned to “capacity building,” civil society, and 
rule of law aid intended to stimulate development of private institutions and 
governance.171  Aid and other forms of intervention no longer f lowed almost 
exclusively to government institutions (including educational institutions), but found 
partners outside government bureaucracies.  While the most dramatic shift in dollars 
f lowing to Thailand has been the reduction of American military aid after the 1980s, 
equally significant has been a shift from funding government to funding activities in 
the private sector.172  Paralleling this rise in civil society funding, networks of 
connection began to form between Thai and foreign advocates and NGOs.  Just as 
“third wave” globalization has involved inf luential exchanges of governance 
knowledge and resources from the top down, this phase of globalization has also 
involved influential exchanges of advocacy knowledge and resources from the bottom 
up.173
171. Hess, supra note 35, at 329–32; Carothers, supra note 34.  “Capacity building” is a new catch-all term 
referring to improvement in the institutional capacity of organizations in developing countries, from 
government agencies, to trade organizations, to human rights or environmental NGOs.  See, e.g., United 
Nations, Capacity Building for Local Governance, http://esa.un.org/techcoop/f lagship.
asp?Code=SAF99001 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (describing the UN’s call for improved local governance 
capacity in South Africa).  The concept responds generally to Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass 
North’s call for emphasis on institutional development and increased rule of law capacity as a foundation 
for economic development.  See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Speech 
upon receipt of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Dec. 
9, 1993), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html.
172. See Hess, supra note 35.  Data from websites and archives of the following agencies were compiled to 
obtain a half-century perspective on American funding for Thailand: USAID, Ford Foundation, 
Rockefeller Foundation, The Asia Foundation, The Foundation Center (including grants by the Open 
Society Institute and the Carnegie Foundation).  See, e.g., Ford Foundation Grants, http://www.
fordfound.org/searchresults?thailand (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing list of grants, including 
amount of funding and specific programs made to Thailand); Rockefeller Foundation Grant Search 
Results, http://www.rockfound.org/grants/GrantSearch.aspx?keywords=thailand (last visited, Mar. 1, 
2009) (providing list of approved grants and a synopsis of the program); USAID Regional Development 
Mission for Asia: Thailand, http://www.usaid.gov/rdma/countries/thailand.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009).  Some agencies, notably The Asia Foundation, the United States Embassy, Ford Foundation, and 
Rockefeller Foundation, have local staff members who are friendly with and even integrated into local 
advocacy and NGO communities.  Some have had long term relationships with the community of 
potential beneficiaries.  This is true of government agencies as well, like the staff of the United States 
Embassy, which sometimes holds points of view that are closer to the Thai NGO community than to 
Washington policy makers.  Interview with Ben Svasdi, Dir., Trafcord, in Chiangmai, Thailand (July 
6, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Trafcord Director]; Interview with staff member, United States 
Embassy, in Bangkok, Thailand (Jan. 29, 2008).
173. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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 More important than the total aid f lowing to Thailand is the manner in which 
interventions occurred: to whom, for what activities, and with what effect?  Some 
changes in legal institutions have been significant and supported to some degree by 
funding from abroad, including the establishment of special courts for domestic 
relations, intellectual property, and labor; the drafting and ratification of the liberal 
1997 Constitution; the adoption of an administrative court system; the promotion of 
a “green bench” to handle environmental cases; and the promotion and adoption of 
new organic laws for criminal cases, environmental law, and women’s rights (all 
relevant areas of cause lawyering concern).  
 The effects of these globalization influences on cause lawyering are indirect and 
symbolic until put into practice, and their everyday meaning, or as Merry says, their 
meaning in the “vernacular,”174 may be better understood through the experiences of 
cause lawyers.  Thongbai Thongbao’s early career was seemingly inf luenced very 
little by globalization.  His childhood preceded globally financed development of the 
Thai countryside, and his education was exclusively in Thai schools.  Yet Thammasat 
University was indirectly a product of modernization, created by a Western-educated 
idealist who believed in constitutionalism and democracy, and who intended 
university education to inculcate values of public service and government under law. 
Thongbai was inclined at an early age to embrace both of these values, even if not 
precisely in the way envisioned by Pridi.  Thongbai’s early successful confrontations 
with military dictatorships which launched his career may have been subtly 
intertwined with the United States’ efforts to moderate Sarit’s brutality, but there is 
no direct evidence for this.175  International human rights advocates did not express 
concern about Thailand until 1976.176  And though Thongbai received much 
international recognition for his defense of human rights, and in 1984 was a recipient 
of the prestigious Magasaysay Award for Public Service,177 at this stage in his career 
he had already gained knowledge, power, and legitimacy for his work.  Yet Thongbai’s 
early belief in government accountability and in the rule of law were clearly influenced 
both by twentieth-century westernization of Thailand’s legal system and new political 
ideals, such as Communism, as well as by more traditional Thai values underlying 
Buddhism and reverence for the monarchy.  
 Somchai Homla-or, like Thongbai, was educated exclusively in Thailand, but 
Somchai attended school in the “American Era” of intellectual fervor and rising 
174. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
175. Sarit, the dictator who arrested Thongbai, was usually particularly brutal toward opponents.  Baker & 
Phongpaichit, supra note 4, at 169, 173.  Yet Thongbai and other political prisoners were treated 
relatively well in prison.  Thongbai may have been genuinely respected by the military and the police, as 
he claims, or as a journalist he may have worked for a publisher with some inf luence in Sarit’s regime. 
If American inf luence was also being exercised behind the scenes to moderate Sarit’s bloodthirsty rule, 
we have no evidence that the United States was concerned about Thongbai.  
176. American philanthropy never involved funding the defense of human rights in Thailand as it had in 
Latin America.  See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 357 (describing the purpose of American 
philanthropy in Latin America).
177. See supra note 111.
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expectations.178  Two of the most important Thai student leaders of the 1973 uprising 
had just returned from an American Friends Field Service fellowship in the United 
States.  China’s break with Russia in 1960, and the ensuing years of rapid economic 
growth, was capped by Mao Tse-tung’s unleashing of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, inspiring youthful idealists everywhere, especially in nearby 
Asian societies.179  Nevertheless, Somchai did not have direct contact with, or receive 
support from, global resources until his exile from 1987 to 1989, when he began to 
form a network of contacts with human rights advocates and sources of future 
funding.  Somchai’s return in 1989 coincided with the growing power of the NGO 
movement and, soon after, the overthrow in 1992 of a military dictatorship and the 
national movement toward a more meaningful and liberal constitution.  The 1997 
Constitution, together with his networking through the Lawyers Council, provided 
a powerful cause lawyering mechanism.  Somchai built a network of lawyers, urging 
them to use the new rights in litigation to push the courts to give them meaning. 
Further he has employed his international contacts to increase Thailand’s connection 
to human rights movements elsewhere; for example, he became co-founder of Forum 
Asia and was its first Secretary General.  From his international contacts he has 
drawn resources for his network, providing funding for the training of young lawyers, 
for advocacy projects on behalf of migrants and stateless people, and for the defense 
of libel cases against the media.  
 Surachai has networked far less with international social cause advocates than 
Somchai,180 but his Thai network with NGO staff and academics has provided 
important global resources.  Service-oriented NGOs often receive funding from 
American and European sources, and indeed some of Surachai’s NGOs were founded 
with such seed money.  The Friends of Women Foundation, where Surachai made 
many contacts, was one such NGO.  EnLaw, the NGO that definitively shaped his 
career, if not his identity, was created at the suggestion of an American foundation, 
which offered funding for environmental litigation.  Typical of much international 
funding, the EnLaw grant was a one-time grant that has not been renewed.  EnLaw 
has received no further funding from international sources and struggles to support 
its activities.  Less apparent from funding patterns alone, Surachai has networked 
internationally with other environmental litigators, although his principal sources of 
legal expertise have been unusually creative Thai academics.  Like Somchai, 
Surachai’s focus on litigation has meant that changes in the law and constitution 
have potentially great significance for his practice.  The litigation that he began 
before EnLaw was created is derived from a law adopted by Thailand in the early 
178. Western-educated leaders and intellectuals like Puey Ungpakorn, then Chair of Thammasat University’s 
Department of Economics and Rector of Thammasat University, believed in liberal government and 
greater democracy as well as in free market development.  Student idealism was shaped by international 
events, including the rebellion by Parisian students in 1968, the U.S. anti-war movement driving 
American presidential politics, and the Great Proletarian Revolution in China in 1966.
179. See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China 440, 602 (1990).
180. Command of foreign language is an important key to networking internationally.  Surachai speaks no 
foreign language, while Somchai is f luent in English.
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1990s to comply with an international environmental accord.181  Although the 
community rights and public participation provisions of the 1997 Constitution 
remain largely rhetorical, even after recent adoption of a community rights organic 
law, the creation of an administrative court system created a valuable resource for 
cause lawyers.  Surachai filed the first case in administrative court, and subsequently 
has won decisions against agencies for failure to develop adequate standards for public 
protection against toxic waste and environmental hazards.182  He has been among the 
first to push the administrative courts to articulate new standards in order to make 
existing law clearer and stronger. 
 Duean’s career has been influenced more than the other three by international 
advocacy and funding.183  Trafcord, her current employer, is a project initiated by the 
Thai government and a British-Thai philanthropist (who is the project’s director but 
not a founder), and supported almost entirely through international organizations: 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
World Vision, and most importantly, the United States Embassy.  Unlike the other 
three lawyers, Duean is an employee whose work is directed by others.  Thus, 
priorities attached to funding for Trafcord have an important influence on her work 
and Trafcord priorities are particularly sensitive to U.S. funding for anti-trafficking 
and prostitution.
  2. Dependence and Independence
 The career narratives enable a careful reassessment of Dezalay and Garth’s 
hypothesis that the viability of cause lawyering is highly dependent on global support 
to sustain and legitimize cause lawyers’ careers.184  The view from Thailand is more 
textured.  Thongbai had little contact with global advocacy in the formative stages of 
his career, and his legitimacy seems to have come from other sources.  Similarly, 
Somchai Homla-or’s early career may have been inf luenced in its early stages by 
idealism inspired, in part, from movements outside of Thailand and the increasing 
availability and cosmopolitan inf luence of university education, supported in 
significant part by American philanthropy.  But not until much later in his career did 
he receive direct support from international funding, networking, or legitimating 
181. Interview with Amnat Wongbandit, Professor, Thammasat University, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 19, 
2008).  For information on relating to the environmental law adopted by Thailand, see PCD:  National 
Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 1992, http://www.pcd.go.th/info_serv/en_reg_envi.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2009).   
182. See, e.g., Pennapha Hongtong, Pollution Control Department Ordered to Pay Compensation for Klity 
Villagers, The Nation, July 5, 2008, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/05/07/
national/national_30072401.php; Apinya Wipatayotin, Klity Creek Karan Awarded B743,000, Bangkok 
Post, May 7, 2008, available at http://archives.mybangkokpost.com/bkkarchives/frontstore/search_
result.html?type=a&key=Klity&year=2008.
183. Her first job was with a Japanese business.  Her second, and current, job is with an American-funded 
human trafficking NGO. 
184. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 354–57.  Dezalay and Garth found that cause lawyers in Latin 
America are highly dependent upon on global support.  Id.
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recognition of his work.  Duean’s career is most thoroughly intertwined with global 
funding and international pressures to address the problems of human trafficking, 
and even her NGO, which through its funding is closely linked to American policies, 
receives essential network support and legitimacy from the Thai government.   
 Surachai’s career is a particularly interesting case study for Dezalay and Garth’s 
hypothesis.  Surachai’s experience supports their hypothesis that global support is 
important.  His career also shows that notwithstanding a funder’s goals, the recipient’s 
own, somewhat different goals may continue to guide the use of the resources. 
Support from the Blacksmith Institute for environmental litigation has transformed 
his career, bringing him success as a lawyer and national recognition as an expert 
litigator and a people’s lawyer.  Surachai has become a litigator of environmental law 
cases, but protection of the environment is not the cause he represents.  Nor is he 
dependent upon international resources.  He has expanded the field of cause lawyering 
and its legitimacy in Thailand, and though still not adequate for his needs, he receives 
support from Thai sources, including support from the Lawyers Council and 
government support for research projects.  His environmental litigation is 
opportunistic, but his perspective is broad and idealistic, and it is motivated by his 
understanding of poverty, exclusion, and communities as “environmental” issues. 
  3. Cooptation by TANs
 Career narratives also suggest that the “spiral model” proposed by Sikkink and 
her colleagues does not fully appreciate the effectiveness of some types of rights-
oriented, local advocacy in overcoming government resistance to the recognition of 
rights.  Thongbai’s defense of civil liberties and Somchai Homla-or’s advocacy for 
human rights are quite consistent with global movements for human rights.  But 
global pressure directed toward Thailand on human rights issues has had little 
apparent influence.  Although Thailand’s abuses of human rights are well-documented 
by Human Rights Watch, the Asian Human Rights Commission, and other 
watchdogs, neither the incidents identified nor the institutional weaknesses 
underlying them have become a major focus of global pressure.185  
 Where global concerns intersect with local advocacy, a further problem is 
apparent, namely a misalignment between global and local goals.  Surachai’s 
environmental law advocacy appears to parallel the goals of well-established 
environmental advocacy by large, international NGOs such as the International 
185. Activists in close touch with the realities of Thai institutional performance provide trenchant criticisms. 
For example, the performance of the police has repeatedly drawn criticism.  Even United Nations 
recommendations have been ignored.  Asian Human Rights Commission, Thailand: UN Recommendations 
Matter, July 24, 2006, http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/653/; see also 
Awzar Thi (pen name for a staff member of the Asian Human Rights Commission), Thai Police Are Best 
Organized Criminals, UPI Asia Online, Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://www.ahrchk.net/ahrc-in-
news/mainfile.php/2008ahrcinnews/1853/.  Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticized Thailand 
for human rights violations related to drug interdiction, treatment of refugees, and suppression of 
Muslim unrest in the south.  Human Rights Watch, World Report : Events of , at 
329–39 (2007), http://hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf.   
795
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
Union for Conservation of Nature and the Wildlife Fund.186  These large NGOs 
specialize in establishing relationships with the highest level of government that can 
be used to mobilize action to remedy problems brought to light by grassroots 
advocates.187  But Surachai’s concerns are not their concerns.  While they work on 
forest management, trafficking in animals, water and air pollution, Surachai has 
little concern for the larger pattern of environmental quality regulation.  Instead, like 
many of the lawyers working at the grassroots in Thailand on human rights issues, 
he is concerned about popular democracy, and the results that count for him are 
gains in popular participation and government accountability.  A potential alliance 
between cause lawyers for communities threatened by development and global 
defenders of the environment might be possible, but Surachai’s career narrative 
suggests that a wide gap still exists in Thailand between local and global advocacy.  
  4. Winners and Losers
 These four careers illustrate many types of global influence but leave open the 
question of its impact.  By century’s end, not only had the number of cause lawyers 
increased, but their careers were more varied, including small private law firms, 
university faculty, and a wide variety of NGOs, which ranged from “Thai-style” 
partnerships with government to NGOs emphasizing social movement support.  The 
increasing number of cause lawyers is associated mostly, but not exclusively, with the 
growing number of lawyers working for NGOs rather than an increase in the number 
of lawyers in self-sustaining private practices.  An impact of global funding might be 
described as picking “winners” and “losers” among potential cause lawyers.  Funding 
and legitimation may be provided at critical moments when a cause lawyer or project 
would not otherwise survive, or be initiated at all.  Surachai’s EnLaw project is one 
example of funding that has reshaped a cause lawyer’s career.  Duean’s employment 
by Trafcord is the clearest example.  But the narratives also illustrate the independence 
of much cause lawyering work, its local support, legitimacy, and impact apart from 
global resources.  
 If survival is one measure of the impact of funding, a second measure is its effect 
on what cause lawyers do.  Thai scholar Amara Pongsapich has suggested that Thai-
style NGOs that cooperate with the government rather than oppose it have 
contributed little to the end-goal of cause lawyering, namely expanding political 
space.188  Funding from international sources, especially the United States, favors 
organizations perceived as capable of cooperating with government rather than 
186. See, e.g., IUCN Asia Regional Office, http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretariat/offices/asia/asia_
where_work/thailand/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); World Wildlife Fund Environmental 
Conservation Work in Thailand, http://www.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/thailand/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2009).
187. Interview with an officer of the WWF Thailand, in Bangkok, Thailand (July 27, 2008).  He described 
the general methods used by large environmental foundations.
188. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 226.
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expanding political space directly through public opposition to government policies.189 
Understandably, perhaps, U.S. funding favors strengthening government capacity 
and contributing to interest group advocacy consistent with U.S. policy initiatives, 
such as drug interdiction and human trafficking prevention rather than political 
party or mass movement support.190  More surprising, perhaps, is the parallel focus of 
private funding, which continues to complement U.S. policies.  “Development,” as 
interpreted by almost every American and European philanthropy, means 
development of routine, non-contentious citizen participation.191  This emphasis 
might be deemed appropriate in a society with an open polity and tolerance for 
political dissent.  Restricting funding for advocacy to such purposes in a society 
where the means and goals of dissent are far more limited and contested may actually 
undermine the most important purpose of social cause advocacy and cause lawyering, 
namely making change possible.  
  5. Contingent Funding: Thai-Style NGOs 
 One of the puzzles of cause lawyering, indeed a question raised frequently about 
the rule of law, is whether law can truly limit the state’s power.  Duean works for an 
NGO that partners with government agencies to enforce the law and resolve 
important conflicts in the government’s policies for dealing with trafficked women. 
We might ask then, why is Duean a cause lawyer at all, if she sees herself not an 
opponent of government power but its ally?   
 The term “Thai-style” NGO was entirely new to me when I began this project. 
A “Thai-style” NGO is typically a network which coordinates the efforts of 
professionals from public and private agencies to address a social problem.192  Their 
uniqueness arises from an ambiguous relationship with the government: sometimes 
strenuously opposing and at other times helping to implement government policies, 
sometimes training government personnel, sometimes operating under a contract 
with a government ministry, and sometimes using Thai government or foreign aid in 
ways officially disapproved of, but tacitly condoned in order to make a policy more 
189. While this has certainly been true for U.S. philanthropy and foreign aid, some European governments 
and foundations have been bolder.  For example, it is well known that DANIDA, the Danish 
development agency, funded the organization that for a time blocked construction of the Thai-Malaysia 
pipeline.  Penchom Interview, supra note 126.
190. See Muscat, supra note 96, at 11–13; Robert Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai 
Development Policy (1994).  Funded projects include academic projects, legislation development, and 
informing citizens of their rights, but not social movements, direct political action (such as lobbying) or 
political organizing.  See generally The Asia Foundation: Projects, http://asiafoundation.org/project/
projectsearch.php?country=thailand (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
191. See Hess, supra note 35, at 323–24.  Targets for funding in the mid-1980s were selected in part based on 
whether they had a record of cooperating with government.  The UCL was considered a questionable 
target because of its history of conflict with government.  Although not mentioned in the report, the 
consultant’s assessment may well have been inf luenced by the suspicion of “communist” leanings 
attached to leaders like Somchai Homla-or.  Ford Foundation Report, supra note 157, at 39–42.  
192. “Thai-style” is not an official term.  It describes NGOs that have a certain collaborative style while 
adhering to a social cause; they are usually aware of the risks of compromise.
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consistent with the needs of a vulnerable population.193  Therefore, they are often 
concerned with social policies that are ill-served by existing government programs 
and which foreign governments and international philanthropies find appealing for 
their own political or humanitarian reasons. 
 Trafcord, Duean’s employer, makes an illuminating case study.  Trafcord was 
described by one Asia Foundation staff person as the best Thai-style NGO.  The 
independent wealth of Trafcord’s founder has allowed him to dedicate his career to 
social issues in Thailand, initially helping HIV/AIDs victims and, as an outgrowth, 
“rescuing” primarily women, and occasionally men, who have been trafficked for sex 
work and labor.194  While Thai police tend to downplay the importance of trafficking 
in relation to “real” crime, other Thai ministries have been deeply concerned about 
the welfare of women.  The Thai government has typically lacked the will and 
capacity to overcome these conflicts and to act effectively without external funding. 
In 2007, a high level Thai governmental commission addressed this policy incapacity 
by creating a mandate in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
under which Thai police, military, and welfare agencies must cooperate in addressing 
the problem.  Trafcord became the agency with sufficient credibility to attract foreign 
funding and sufficient expertise to direct government officials assigned to the 
problem.   
 Foreign governments and philanthropies have provided a great deal of aid for 
trafficking interventions.  For example, the United States has provided funding to 
aid sex-trafficking intervention, but the funding came with strings attached reflecting 
the conservative values of the Congress and the Bush administration.195  These 
strings limit the objectives and methods of intervention by criminalizing prostitution 
193. Thai-style NGOs serve many of the covert policy functions that U.S. fiscal federalism is said to serve in 
the administration of its social welfare policies: helping to reconcile conf licting mandates, making 
discretionary choices that would be difficult to make at a higher, more public level of decision making, 
or by simply ignoring formal constraints that make a policy unworkable—with all of the accompanying 
hazards.  For discussion of U.S. programs exhibiting this pattern of delegation, see John P. Dwyer, The 
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecology L.Q. 233 (1990); Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political 
Spectacle”: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligation in Social Welfare History, 56 
Brook. L. Rev. 899, 942–43 (1990).  
194. Interview with Trafcord Director, supra note 172.  Initially, the problem of prostitution involved two 
f lows of migrants, one from poor rural families to the brothels of Bangkok during the Vietnam War, 
and a second f low from Thailand to Europe, America, and elsewhere to work in the sex trade or low 
wage sweatshops.  Both problems continue, but now new sources of trafficking have become a major 
concern in Thailand, namely the f low of poor Burmese and Laotian women into the sex trade.  Id.
195. Consistent with President Bush’s conservative social agenda, the Bush administration obtained 
legislation to condition anti-sex trafficking aid to developing countries on compliance with conditions 
requiring, among other things, criminalization of prostitution but offering no assistance to relieve 
poverty, which is often a root cause of women’s involvement in sex-trafficking.  See supra note 135.  See 
generally Edi C. M. Kinney, Appropriations for the Abolitionists: Undermining Effects of the U.S. Mandatory 
Anti-prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and HIV/AIDS, 21 Berkeley J. Gender 
L. & Just. 158 (2006).  
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and punishing offenders rather than by addressing the underlying problems196 by 
helping potential victims through better education, poverty relief, or pregnancy and 
disease prevention options before traffickers take them.197  
 While Trafcord is unique in having such a high-level mandate, other Thai-style 
NGOs have filled similar policy and enforcement gaps and added their own emphasis 
to government policies by providing expertise and advocacy, while avoiding rancorous 
conf lict with government agencies.  As a result, they are often among the most 
trusted outsiders, capable of intervening when Western-style hired gun advocates fail 
to gain an audience with officials.  Thai-style NGOs blur the lines of public and 
private, insiders and outsiders, by acting under or against government authority. 
Unlike the bureaucratic polity at mid-century, which constituted a political space 
closed to all but powerful elites, NGOs like Trafcord define a different kind of 
political space in which exercise of governmental authority is textured by relationships 
with trusted outsiders who possess expertise or access or resources to make government 
policies work and, in many cases, to relieve external political pressure.198  
 In turn, the ambiguous political space occupied by NGOs, such as Trafcord, also 
creates ambiguous roles for lawyers who work for them.  Duean’s commitment to 
“king and the law” may be understood not only as her understanding of Trafcord’s 
mission, but also as an expression of her belief in the morality of government and its 
leadership.  Duean says she is the trafficking victim’s legal advisor.  She often is the 
only lawyer on the scene or at any subsequent proceeding unless she recruits another 
attorney to appear in court for the victim.  Yet she says her duty “is with the law.” 
Although Duean might not characterize her own conduct as coercive, she uses her 
position as Trafcord’s lawyer and the victim’s advisor to persuade reluctant women to 
testify against their former traffickers in spite of the risk of retaliation and in spite of 
the belief of some women that they are “voluntary” workers.  That is precisely why 
she is an idealist and a cause lawyer.  Her duty to the law is a moral mission, not 
technical assistance.  She also coerces resistant police and military to obey the terms 
of the MOU.  She and her co-workers have built a powerful network of higher 
ranking officials within each participating agency, and she deploys her insider 
connections and commitments to bring officials, as well as victims, into line with the 
law.  
196. Because trafficked women typically come from very poor families, some sex workers “voluntarily” enter 
the trade to earn wages.  Most, it has been argued by foreign funders, are coerced, and many feminists 
claim that sex work by desperately poor women, and perhaps any woman, can never be voluntary. 
197. The emphasis of the Bush administration’s so-called “ABC” policy has been quite the opposite.  “ABC” 
stands for “Abstain, Be faithful, use Condoms.”  Yifat Susskind, African Women Confront Bush’s AIDS 
Policy, Foreign Policy in Focus, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1207-30.
htm.  
198. Although I noted the analogy between devolution in Thailand and the symbolic politics of devolution 
of difficult policy choices within the American federal system, the relationship between government 
and Thai-style NGOs is not merely symbolic devolution of responsibility but without real power to alter 
policy.  Because of the limitations of contemporary Thai government administration, the relationship is 
often one of symbiosis, not domination.   
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VI. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL SPACE AND NETWORKS OF LAW
 Until recently, courts in Thailand rarely opened space for social change.199  All 
four of the cause lawyers discussed in this article said that the government’s failure to 
follow law is an important reason for their work.  Thai cause lawyers, including the 
four discussed in this article, often devote as much effort to changing the government 
from the inside as they do to assisting confrontation between the government and 
outsiders or to “playing for rules.”  Yet they approach collaboration and confrontation 
in different ways.   
 In contrast to Duean Wongsa, Somchai Homla-or and Surachai Trong-ngam 
describe their work as support for people’s movements.  Their strategy is long term. 
In practice, much of what they do supports NGOs, attempts to enforce laws that are 
on the books, or pressures the judiciary to make constitutional rights more than 
principled rhetoric.  They have advised groups locked in confrontations with the 
government, but they also have worked with government through Thai-style NGOs, 
like the Friends of Women Foundation, which employed Surachai, received 
government funding to train government officials in human rights, and advised 
ministries about policy.  Their justifications for cause lawyering are political, yet 
their work is complex and involves some of the same puzzles as Duean’s work.  
 Pongsapich argues that opening space for change has been the first priority of 
social movement.  Historically, political space for popular participation has been 
limited,200 and progress toward more open political space has occurred through a 
“bottom up” process of popular political involvement, which breaks the pattern of 
limited participation.  Expansion of political space has been achieved during three 
periods of collective popular resistance to authoritarian rule and subsequent 
negotiations for changes in norms of governance by “civil society” organizations—the 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1932, the October revolution of 1973, and the uprising 
that ended the military dictatorship in 1992.201  Successful confrontations have been 
characterized by increasingly outspoken criticism of authority; mass demonstrations, 
often bloody reprisals by the military, police, and right wing groups; and the moral 
collapse of an authoritarian government.  Courts, and rule of law, have played only a 
marginal role in opening political space at these times.  In the aftermath, a new 
constitution may reflect the “constitutional moment,” but new rights depend on real 
gains in power by organizations representing the people.  
 According to Pongsapich’s theory, the power of ordinary people, and a key to 
opening political space, lies in “thickening” networks of civil society organizations.202 
199. See Vitit Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law and Aspects of Human Rights in Thailand,  in Asian Discourses of 
the Rule of Law, supra note 32, at 346, 360–64.
200. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 216.  
201. Amara Pongsapich argues the network is thickening and getting stronger.  The two most important 
periods of “negotiation” have been 1973–1975 and 1992–1997.  This 1992–1997 period has yielded 
politically engaged “civil society” organizations.  Id. at 236–37.  
202. Non-elite, political engagement in Thailand at any level through privately organized communities, 
interest groups, or nation-wide collective action was quite rare, partly because of the absence of 
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Somchai Homla-or and Surachai Trong-ngam embrace a similar evolutionary theory 
of political development, viewing the rule of law as an important tool to open political 
space for communities and popular movements to negotiate with the government. 
But Professor Pongsapich believes that the civil society organizations that count are 
those that oppose the government, not those that cooperate.  Thai-style NGOs, 
including most NGOs funded by international agencies, have contributed only 
marginally, if at all, to opening political space.  She views their work as a classic case 
of cooptation by the government, rendering them unable to influence the framework 
of governance in the long run.  Pongsapich’s theory of political change through social 
movement activity has important implications for the role of cause lawyers.203  
 Pongsapich’s theory may indeed provide insight into both everyday negotiations 
between cause lawyers and powerful agencies and the momentous negotiations that 
transform the constitutions governing civil society.204  The results of everyday 
collaboration with the government may be more complex and more significant than 
she anticipates; the dependency between the government and Thai-style collaborators 
is often two-way.  The opening for constitutionalism in the 1990s was in part a result 
of stronger NGOs and more confident popular leaders.  As a consequence, Thongbai 
Thongbao, the combative human rights litigator, became a member of a constitutional 
drafting assembly in 1996 and was elected to be a senator in 2000, career capstones 
no one could have predicted when he began his career in Lad Praow prison in the 
1950s.  
 All of the cause lawyers described in this article have worked for Thai-style 
NGOs and the government.  They have worked not only as trainers and teachers, but 
underlying “civil society” organization.  Few interest groups existed above the level of family or 
community agricultural cooperatives and non-participatory governance did not encourage formation of 
groups for participation in politics.  The emergence of citizen groups that can inf luence policy or politics 
has been quite recent.  As described previously in the text, during the “American Era” in the 1960s and 
1970s, student groups began to form and some rural communities began to mobilize against development. 
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  Since 1973, “civil society” has grown rapidly through 
community organizing and NGO building by committed advocates, formation of political parties after 
parliamentary democracy began to become established in the 1980s, and still more recently, formation 
of political action groups mobilizing mass support to inf luence Parliament and government.  In more 
established democracies, civil society organizations have existed in greater numbers over longer periods 
of time, often growing out of long standing communities of interest, collectively representing a wide 
array of non-political and political interests, and having deep roots (i.e., their existence is widely known 
and organizing is wide-spread and ongoing).   In Thailand, these organizations have a much shorter 
history and are linked almost exclusively to advocacy.  Coloring public perceptions is the fact that a 
great many NGOs, including “Thai-style” NGOs, have received substantial support from sources 
outside of Thailand.      
203. See Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 217–20.  
204. The classic case study of “cooptation,” in the management of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
projects, describes relationships between a public project and the seemingly less powerful local agencies 
and actors.  See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of 
Formal Organization (1949).  Yet the lesson of the TVA was not that the larger federal authority 
prevailed, but precisely that its purposes were altered by its need to accommodate local needs brokered 
by local organizations.  Through the inf luence of local organizations, local interests altered the course 
and inf luence of the project. 
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as legal advisors, defenders of the rights of staff, organizers, and the people they 
serve, and, as Duean’s work for Trafcord illustrates, missionaries spreading respect 
for law and public morality among lower level government officials.  Against the 
backdrop of institutional resistance, “civil society” organizations have grown in 
number and legitimacy, and therefore have an increasing ability to mobilize dissent. 
While a careful examination of the growth of civil society in Thailand is beyond the 
scope of my present discussion, it is not hard to imagine that small gains won by 
cause lawyers and other advocates might help provide the foundation for mass 
mobilizations of the kind that led to important constitutional moments in Thai legal 
development.205  
 Thongbai Thongbao, Somchai Homla-or, Surachai Trong-ngam, and Duean 
Wongsa have different ways of reconciling a social vision with the limited capabilities 
of Thai law.  Duean acts for “king and the law,” Somchai and Surachai act “for the 
people” and communities, and Thongbai Thongbao’s law practice enforces moral 
limits that even authoritarian rulers, and their police and military, respect.  The 
viable forms of cause lawyering have multiplied as social change has created new 
career opportunities, and, with the broadening opportunities for practice with a 
social vision, the variety of visions of the transformative possibility for law have 
increased.  In different measures, these visions blend traditional and legal authority, 
formal and substantive goals, and change and continuity of Thailand’s traditions of 
governance.  
 Underlying each vision is a conf lict between the pull of authority under a 
European-style social compact reflected in law and respect for traditional authority 
symbolized by the monarchy and a Buddhist regard for others.  Opening political 
space and strengthening the rule of law have often involved collaborating with 
traditional authorities, and strengthening them as well, sometimes on the cause 
lawyers’ terms.  Mass protests that led to three “constitutional moments” were not 
aimed at bringing down the structure of the traditional Thai state.  During the three 
significant moments of expansion of political space a sense of proportion quickly 
returned without revolution and bloody reprisals against elites.  Political change came 
about through negotiations that simultaneously established the responsibilities of the 
government and the legitimacy of the government—its authority was restored on 
new terms.206  
205. I am deeply indebted to Nick Cheesman whose stimulating and thoughtful insights about Thai politics 
and rule of law are based on many years of work as a human rights advocate in Burma and Thailand.  I 
owe to him the suggestion that Asian societies, like Thailand, with a history of bureaucratic governance 
and authoritarian politics, create governance systems that allow small gains through processes that 
absorb the efforts and energy of human rights advocates who devote proportionately less time to more 
meaningful institutional change.  It might be argued further that a political morality of paternalistic 
governance, as in Thailand, plays a role in creating a system of small gains and (perversely) limiting the 
expectations of advocates.  In the text, however, I argue that such a system need not lead to profound 
cynicism about change because small changes of the right kind may incrementally build capacity to 
undertake larger changes.
206. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 223–27.  While the rights of the people may have played a role in this 
process, their role is likely to have been wholly different from modern Western conceptions of 
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 By viewing cause lawyers solely through their collaboration with government and 
Thai-style NGOs, we may be inclined to conclude that they participate in a system 
of small gains while failing to address major defects in the rule of law because of the 
law’s lack of legitimacy or the absence of a powerful court system.  Such criticism 
may misunderstand their vision of a good society because, as citizens of the Global 
North, our own consciousness of constitutional limits and law is different.  Rule by 
powerful, and ideally, moral elites is deeply ingrained in Thai culture.  The rule of 
law has been embraced as a corrective mechanism for some of the system’s worst 
abuses, but “top-down” change cannot remake the meaning of authority, leadership, 
or legitimacy embedded in everyday life without a deeper transformation that 
Thailand has never attempted or desired.  Social hierarchy still plays an important 
role in governance.  Ambiguous, Thai-style collaboration with government may 
make sense to cause lawyers under many circumstances because it blends the rule of 
law with the social relationships they value, creating a new culture of governance and 
opportunities for change.  Further research about cause lawyers, their social vision, 
and the Thai institutions they seek to transform will reveal more about the validity 
of the suggestive implications drawn from these career narratives.  
constitutionalism and rule of law based on a passive acceptance of the legitimacy of authority and may 
be closer to the direct popular participation of Americans during the American Revolutionary War.  
